

INTERVENTION of
International Communism
in GUATEMALA



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The contents of PART ONE of this volume have been previously published.

PART TWO represents a case history of a bold attempt on the part of international communism to get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere by gaining control of the political institutions of an American Republic. The situation in Guatemala has changed since this document was prepared. Nevertheless, it is the view of the Government of the United States that the facts herein constitute a grim lesson to all nations and peoples which desire to maintain their independence.

PART ONE

INTERVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE AMERICAS

Statement by Secretary Dulles, Caracas, Venezuela, March 8, 1954

The United States has introduced a resolution under the agenda item "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics." Our proposal is before you.

Its preamble first recalls the prior resolutions finding international communism to be a threat and then records our judgment that this threat still persists.

The first operative portion declares that, if the international Communist movement should come to dominate the political institutions of any American State, that would be a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of us all, endangering the peace of America and calling for appropriate action.

In accordance with existing treaties, the second operative portion calls for disclosures and exchanges of information, which would expose and weaken the Communist conspiracy.

What is international communism? In the course of the general debate, one of the Foreign Ministers (the Minister of Guatemala) asked, "What is international communism?" I thought that by now every Foreign Minister of the world knew what international communism is. It is disturbing if the foreign affairs of one of our American Republics are conducted by one so innocent that he has to ask that question.

But since the question has been asked, it shall be answered. International communism is that far-flung clandestine political organization which is operated by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since 1939, it has brought 15 once independent nations into a state of abject servitude. It has a hard core of agents in practically every country of the world. The total constitutes not a theory, not a doctrine, but an aggressive, tough, political force, backed by great resources, and serving the most ruthless empire of modern times.

Most of the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party appear before the eyes of the world as responsible officials of the Soviet Government. In this capacity they conduct relations with the other Governments through the traditional institutions of diplomacy. But at the same time they operate and control this worldwide clandestine political organization to which I have referred.

Until the Second World War, Moscow's control over this organization was exercised openly through the central headquarters of the Communist International, the so-called "Comintern." That was a political association to which all of the Communist parties belonged and it had its seat in Moscow. During the war the Comintern was officially abolished. Since that time the control over the foreign Communist parties has been exercised by the Moscow leaders secretly and informally, but for the most part no less effectively than before.

As proof of this fact one does not need to search for the precise channels through which this control proceeds, although some of them in fact are known. If one compares Soviet propaganda with the political positions taken by individual Communist officials and agents around the world, both from the standpoint of substance and timing, it becomes clear, beyond possibility of doubt, that there is this highly disciplined hierarchical organization which commands the unquestioned obedience of its individual members.

The disciplinary requirements include a firm insistence that loyalty to the movement, which means in effect loyalty to the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, shall take precedence over every other obligation including love of country, obligation to family, and the honor of one's own personal conduct.

These conclusions are not speculation; they are established facts, well known to all who have seriously studied the Communist apparatus.

The fact that this organization exists does not mean that all members of all Communist parties everywhere are conscious of its existence and of their relationship to it. Only a small proportion of Communist Party members are initiated into complete awareness of the nature of the movement to which they belong and the real sources of its authority. Most national Communist parties masquerade as normal patriotic political parties, purporting to reflect indigenous political impulses and to be led by indigenous elements.

Actually, every one of these parties represents a conspiracy within a conspiracy; the rank-and-file members, while serving the purpose of duping others, are to a considerable extent duped by their own leaders. The leaders do not reveal fully to the rank and file either the nature of their own allegiance or the sources of their own authority and funds.

The overall purpose for which this organization is maintained and operated is to act as an instrument for the advancement of the worldwide political aims of the dominant group of Moscow leaders.

This, then, is the answer to "What is international communism?"

It may next be asked whether this international Communist apparatus actually seeks to bring this hemisphere, or parts of it, into the Soviet orbit. The answer must be in the affirmative.

I shall not here accuse any government or any individuals of being either plotters or the dupes of plotters. We are not sitting here as a court to try governments or individuals. We sit rather as legislators. As such, we need to know what will enable us to take appropriate action of a general character in the common interest. Therefore, I shall confine myself to presenting well-established facts of that character.

When the Comintern was operating openly, it trained at Moscow, largely in the Lenin School, numerous persons from the Americas. Some of them are still active.

International Front Organizations

There was a special Comintern headquarters, and there were secret field offices which controlled and supported Communist activities in Latin America. The Comintern also developed a series of international front organizations designed to enable its agents to get popular backing from special groups such as labor, youth, women, students, farmers, etc. These front organizations also served as cover for the Soviet intelligence services.

When the Soviet Communist Party went through the form of abolishing the Comintern, these same front organizations were carried on in a different form, with headquarters shifted from Moscow usually to satellite capitals. The Communist International of Youth emerged as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, with headquarters in Budapest, and as the International Students Union, with headquarters in Prague. There is the Women's International Juridical Association. There is the World Peace Council, located in Prague. There is the World Committee Against War and Fascism. Most powerful of all is the World Federation of Trade Unions, seated under Soviet auspices in Vienna. There is the All Union Society for Cultural Relations Abroad which channels propaganda through its local outlets, the various Soviet friendship societies.

These front organizations carry on important activities in many of the American States. Their members in this hemisphere go back and forth to the Soviet bloc countries, using funds which are supplied by the Soviet Communist Party.

The basic facts I outline are well known. They could be supplemented by masses of detail, but that is unnecessary for our present purposes. It is enough to know that international communism operates strongly in this hemisphere to accomplish the political purposes of its leaders who are at the same time the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and of the Soviet Union.

International communism is not liberating but enslaving. It has been suggested that, even though the international Communist movement operates in this hemisphere, it may serve a liberating purpose, compatible with principles of our American States. Few, I believe,

would argue for that openly. The thesis is advanced rather by innuendo and insinuation.

Such suggestions lose all plausibility when we recall what this Communist movement has done to the nations and the peoples it has come to dominate. Let us think first in terms of nations.

Many of us knew at the United Nations Jan Masaryk, the son of the great author of Czechoslovak freedom. He was a Foreign Minister who believed, until almost the end, that the Communist movement in his country was something different; that it could be reconciled with the national freedom to which his father and he were so passionately dedicated. But in the end his broken corpse was offered to the world as mute evidence of the fact that international communism is never "different" and that there can be no genuine reconciliation between it and national freedom.

Czechoslovakia was stripped of every vestige of sovereignty, as we in the Americas understand that term. It was added to the list of victims, which already in Europe included Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. These ten European nations, once proud and honorable examples of national freedom, have become Soviet serfdoms or worse.

Within all the vast area, now embracing one-third of the world's people, where the military power of the Soviet Union is dominant, no official can be found who would dare to stand up and openly attack the Government of the Soviet Union. But in this hemisphere, it takes no courage for the representative of one of the smallest American countries openly to attack the government of the most powerful.

I rejoice that that kind of freedom exists in the Americas, even if it may be at times abused. But the essential is that there be a relationship of sovereign equality. We of the United States want to keep it that way. We seek no satellites, but only friendly equals. We never want to see at the pan-American table those who speak as the tools of non-American powers. We want to preserve and defend an American society, in which even the weak may speak boldly, because they represent national personalities which, as long as they are free, are equal.

It is the purpose of our resolution to assure that there will always be in this hemisphere such national personalities and dignity.

If now we turn to see what international communism has done to the individual human beings, we find that it has stripped them, too, of their sense of dignity and worth. The professional propagandists for communism talk glibly of lofty aims and high ideals. That is part of the routine—and fraudulent—appeal of the international Communist movement. It is one of the principal means by which the dissatisfied are led to follow false leaders. But once international communism has gained its end and subjected the people to the so-called

"dictatorship of the proletariat," then the welfare of the people ceases to be a matter of practical concern.

Communism and the Worker

Communism, in its initial theoretical stage, was designated primarily to serve the workers and to provide them, not with spiritual values, for communism is atheistic, but at least with a material well-being. It is worthwhile to observe what has actually happened to this favored group in countries subjugated by Communist power.

In these countries the workers have become virtual slaves, and millions of them are literally slaves. Instructive facts are to be found in the United Nations Report on Forced Labor, which was presented to the United Nations Assembly at its last session. The authors of this report were three eminent and independent personalities from India, Norway, and Peru. The report finds that the Soviet Union and its satellites use forced labor on a vast scale. Prior evidence presented to the United Nations indicates that approximately 15 million persons habitually fill the Soviet labor camps.

The Forced Labor Report calls the Soviet method of training and allocating manpower "A system of forced or compulsory labor." The Soviet workers are the most underpaid, overworked persons in any modern industrial state. They are the most managed, checked-on, spied-on, and unrepresented workers in the world today. There is no freedom of movement, for the Russian worker is not allowed to leave his job and shift to another job. He is bound to his job by his labor book. Except for the relative few who have class privileges, wages provide only a pitiful existence. Now, 37 years after the October revolution, unrest and discontent have so mounted in Soviet Russia that the rulers are forced publicly to notice them and to promise relief.

Conditions in the Soviet satellite countries are even worse than in Russia. The captive peoples have been subjected to sharply decreased living standards, since they lost their freedom, and to greater exploitation than prevails in Russia. The workers' outbreak in East Germany of last June showed in one revealing flash how desperate the people have become. Young boys armed only with stones dared to face up to Soviet tanks.

When I was in the East Sector of Berlin last month, the Soviet Foreign Minister referred to that outbreak, and he said that steps had been taken to be sure that it did not happen again. I saw those steps. They consisted of thousands upon thousands of heavily armed soldiers, with machineguns and tanks.

Traditions of liberty have been established in this hemisphere under the leadership of many great patriots. They fought for individual human rights and dignity. They lighted the guiding beacons along freedom's road, which have burned brightly in the healthy air of

patriotic fervor. These beacons must not be stifled by the poisonous air of despotism now being fanned toward our shores from Moscow, Prague, and Budapest.

These places may seem far away. But let us not forget that in the early part of the last century the first danger to the liberties and independence which Bolivar, San Martin, and their heroic associates had won for the new Republics stemmed precisely from the despotic alliance forged by the Czar of Russia.

Sometimes, it seems, we recall that threat only in terms of colonialism. Actually, the threat that was deemed most grave was the desire of Czarist Russia and its allies to extend their despotic political system to this hemisphere.

I recall that President Monroe, in his message to Congress of December 2, 1823, addressed himself particularly to that phase of the problem. He spoke of ending future colonization by any European power, but he spoke with greater emphasis and at greater length of the danger which would come if "the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent" of this hemisphere.

What he said was being said in similar terms by other great American patriots and defenders of human liberty. Those sentiments have long since ceased to be merely unilateral. They have become an accepted principle of this hemisphere. That is why, it seems to us, we would be false to our past unless we again proclaimed that the extension to this hemisphere of alien despotism would be a danger to us all, which we unitedly oppose.

The Price of Freedom

My Government is well aware of the fact that there are few problems more difficult, few tasks more odious, than that of effectively exposing and thwarting the danger of international communism.

As we have pointed out, that danger cloaks itself behind fine sounding words; it uses the cover of many well-intentioned persons, and it so weaves itself into the fabric of community life that great courage and skill are required to sever the evil from the good. The slogan of "nonintervention" can plausibly be invoked and twisted to give immunity to what is, in fact, flagrant intervention.

The fact, however, that the defense of freedom is difficult, and calls for courage, is no adequate excuse for shutting our eyes to the fact that freedom is in fact endangered.

Freedom is never preserved for long except by vigilance and with dedicated effort. Those who do not have the will to defend liberty soon lose it.

Danger to liberty constantly recurs in everchanging form. To meet that danger requires flexibility and imagination. Each of our nations has in the past had to take some difficult and dangerous decisions, of one kind or another, on behalf of the independence and integrity of

this hemisphere. During the 19th century, more than one American nation, including my own, risked the hazard of war against great military powers, rather than permit the intrusion into this hemisphere of the aggressive forces of European imperialism. During this 20th century, when evil forces of militarism and fascism twice sought world domination, the United States paid a great price in blood and treasure which served us all. Each of our American Republics has contributed to what has now become a glorious tradition.

Today we face a new peril that is in many respects greater than any of the perils of the past. It takes an unaccustomed form. It is backed by resources greater than have ever been accumulated under a single despotic will. However, we need not fear, because we too have greater assets. We have greater solidarity and greater trust born out of our past fraternal association. But just as the danger assumes an unconventional form, so our response may also need to be different in its form.

We need not, however, solve all these matters here. What we do need to do is to identify the peril; to develop the will to meet it unitedly, if ever united action should be required; and meanwhile to give strong moral support to those governments which have the responsibility of exposing and eradicating within their borders the danger which is represented by alien intrigue and treachery.

Of course, words alone will not suffice. But words can be meaningful. They can help to forge a greater determination to assure our collective independence, so that each of our nations will, in whatever way that is truly its own, be the master of its destiny. Thus, we will have served our common cause against its enemies.

It is in that spirit and in that hope that the United States presents its resolution.

DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE POLITICAL INTEGRITY OF THE AMERICAN STATES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

Caracas, Venezuela, March 28, 1954

Whereas: The American republics at the Ninth International Conference of American States declared that international communism, by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, and resolved to adopt within their respective territories the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent subversive activities;

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recognized that, in addition to adequate internal measures in each state, a high degree of international cooperation is required to eradicate the danger which the subversive activities of international communism pose for the American States; and

The aggressive character of the international communist movement continues to constitute, in the context of world affairs, a special and immediate threat to the national institutions and the peace and security of the American States, and to the right of each State to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally without intervention in its internal or external affairs by other States.

The Tenth Inter-American Conference

I

Condemns: The activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs;

Expresses: The determination of the American States to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of international communism, acting in the interests of an alien despotism;

Reiterates: The faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy as the best means to promote their social and political progress; and

Declares: That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement,

extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

II

Recommends: That without prejudice to such other measures as they may consider desirable special attention be given by each of the American governments to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting the subversive activities of the international communist movement within their respective jurisdictions:

1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and sources of funds, of those who are spreading propaganda of the international communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf; and

2. The exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding international communism.

III

This declaration of foreign policy made by the American republics in relation to dangers originating outside this hemisphere is designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own form of government and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life.

THE DECLARATION OF CARACAS AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles, March 16, 1954

I returned last Sunday from Caracas after 2 weeks of attendance at the Tenth Inter-American Conference. The Conference is still in session. It has many important matters to deal with, particularly in the social and economic field. Already, however, the Conference has made history by adopting with only one negative vote a declaration that, if the international communism movement came to dominate or control the political institutions of any American State, that would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of all the American States and would endanger the peace of America.

That declaration reflects the thinking of the early part of the nineteenth century. At that time, Czarist Russia was aggressive. Czar Alexander had made a claim to sovereignty along the west coast of this continent and had organized the so-called Holy Alliance which was plotting to impose the despotic political system of Russia and its allies upon the American Republics, which had just won their freedom from Spain.

In 1823, President Monroe, in his message to Congress, made his famous declaration. It contained two major points. The first related to the colonial system of the allied powers of Europe and declared that any extension of their colonial system in this hemisphere would be dangerous to our peace and safety. The second part of the declaration referred to the extension to this hemisphere of the political system of despotism then represented by Czarist Russia and the Holy Alliance. President Monroe declared that "it is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference."

The first part of President Monroe's declaration against extending the European colonial system in this hemisphere has long since been accepted and made an all-American policy by concerted action of the American States. However, the same could not be said of President Monroe's declaration against the extension to this hemisphere of a European despotic system. It seemed to me, as I planned for the Caracas conference, that the threat which stems from international communism is a repetition in this century of precisely the kind of

danger against which President Monroe had made his famous declaration 130 years ago. It seemed of the utmost importance that, just as part of the Monroe declaration had long since been turned from a unilateral declaration into a multilateral declaration of the American States, so it would be appropriate for the American States to unite to declare the danger to them all which would come if international communism seized control of the political institutions of any American State.

That matter was debated at Caracas for 2 weeks and a declaration in the sense proposed by the United States was adopted by a vote of 17 to 1, with 2 abstentions.

I believe that this action, if it is properly backed up, can have a profound effect in preserving this hemisphere from the evils and woes that would befall it if any one of our American States became a Soviet Communist puppet. That would be a disaster of incalculable proportions. It would disrupt the growing unity of the American States which is now reflected by the Charter of the Americas and by the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

It was time that we should have acted as we did because international communism is making great efforts to extend its political control to this hemisphere. The declaration adopted at Caracas, and particularly the sentiments which were expressed during the course of the debate, show an awareness of the danger and a resolution to meet it.

It is significant of the vitality of our American system that no one of the American Republics, even the most powerful, wanted to deal single-handedly with the danger, but that it was brought to the Inter-American Conference table as a matter of common concern. Furthermore, the declaration, as adopted, contained in substance the words of President Eisenhower, expressed in his great peace address of April 16, 1953, that the declaration "is designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own form of government and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life."

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN GUATEMALA

News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles, May 25, 1954

The Guatemalan nation and people as a whole are not Communists. They are predominantly patriotic people who do not want their nation to be dominated by any foreign power. However, it must be borne in mind that the Communists always operate in terms of small minorities who gain positions of power. In Soviet Russia itself only about 3 percent of the people are Communists.

In judging Communist influence in Guatemala three facts are significant:

1. Guatemala is the only American State which has not completed ratification of the Rio Pact of the Americas.
2. Guatemala was the only one of the American States which at the last inter-American Conference at Caracas voted against a declaration that "the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America". . . .
3. Guatemala is the only American nation to be the recipient of a massive shipment of arms from behind the Iron Curtain.

It has been suggested from Guatemala that it needs more armament for defense. Already Guatemala is the heaviest armed of all the Central American States. Its military establishment is three to four times the size of that of its neighbors such as Nicaragua, Honduras, or El Salvador.

The recent shipment was effected under conditions which are far from normal. The shipment was loaded at the Communist-administered Port of Stettin. The ship was cleared for Dakar, Africa. The operation was cloaked under a series of chartering arrangements so that the real shipper was very difficult to discover. When he was discovered he claimed that the shipment consisted of nothing but optical glass and laboratory equipment. When the ship was diverted from its ostensible destination and arrived at Puerto Barrios, it was landed under conditions of extraordinary secrecy and in the personal presence of the Minister of Defense. One cannot but wonder why, if the operation was an aboveboard and honorable one, all of its details were so masked.

By this arms shipment a government in which Communist influence is very strong has come into a position to dominate militarily the Central American area. Already the Guatemalan Government has made gestures against its neighbors which they deem to be threatening and which have led them to appeal for aid.

The Guatemalan Government boasts that it is not a colony of the United States. We are proud that Guatemala can honestly say that. The United States is not in the business of collecting colonies. The important question is whether Guatemala is subject to Communist colonialism, which has already subjected 800 million people to its despotic rule. The extension of Communist colonialism to this hemisphere would, in the words of the Caracas Resolution, endanger the peace of America.

THE GUATEMALAN COMPLAINT BEFORE THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL

Statements made before the Security Council by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,
U. S. Representative to the United Nations

STATEMENT OF JUNE 20

The United States believes in the basic proposition that any member, large or small, has the right to an urgent meeting of the Security Council whenever it feels itself to be in danger. This is so even when, as is sometimes the case, the Security Council may not itself be in the best position to deal directly with the situation.

Guatemala charges that other governments are pursuing a policy of hostility and aggressiveness against it. The specific Guatemalan allegations involve two of its immediate neighbors, Honduras and Nicaragua, who are charged with disturbing the peace in a particular part of Central America. These charges are indeed serious and certainly warrant urgent examination.

But the question arises as to where the situation can be dealt with most expeditiously and most effectively.

The situation appears to the U. S. Government to be precisely the kind of problem which in the first instance should be dealt with on an urgent basis by an appropriate agency of the Organization of American States. The very fact that the Government of Guatemala as a member of the Inter-American System has already requested that the Organization of American States take action strengthens this view.

It would perhaps be in order for me to inform the Council that, while the reports that we receive on the situation in Guatemala are incomplete and fragmentary, the information available to the United States thus far strongly suggests that the situation does not involve aggression but is a revolt of Guatemalans against Guatemalans. The situation in Guatemala, out of which this problem arises, has caused grave concern to the U. S. Government and to the other members of the Organization of American States. Consequently, the members of the Organization of American States have for some time been conferring intensively among themselves on the Guatemalan situation with a view to deciding upon what steps should be taken for the maintenance of peace and security of the continent.

No Charge Against U.S.

I am very glad that the Guatemalan representative made it crystal clear that he makes no charge whatever against the U.S. Government,

because it is certainly true that the United States has no connection whatever with what is taking place.

I am constrained to note that, although he made no charges against the United States, the Guatemalan representative did cite a number of unfavorable comments made by others concerning Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Peurifoy, and Ambassador John M. Cabot. In fact, more of the time of his speech was given up in citing these statements than others had made—newspaper articles and hearsay—than in the actual charge that he made. Those tactics, of course, always give one the impression that instead of being interested in getting the answer to the question, "What is the truth?", the speaker is more interested in getting the answer to the question, "What is the headline going to be?"

Now, I do not think it is necessary for me here in the United Nations to make a lengthy speech about Secretary Dulles. Secretary Dulles has worked here for years. He is very well known personally to most of the men in this room. The merest inference that he could be actuated by any consideration other than that of duty is one which certainly reflects no credit on him who utters it. To anyone who knows President Eisenhower—and many of you know him—it must be crystal clear that there is a man who is utterly devoted to the principles of democracy, to the rights of man, and who abhors all forms of imperialism, who led a great army in World War II against Nazi imperialism, and who has shown by every word and deed of his life since the day when he was a small boy in Kansas that his heart is always on the side of the little man who is trying to get by in life.

The Secretary of State did nothing at Caracas which was not in accordance with the facts. As a matter of fact, the only authorities which the Guatemalan representative cites are the U.S. press. The U.S. press, estimable though it is and deeply as I respect it, does not speak for the U.S. Government, and I am sure the U.S. press will agree with me in that respect. You can find as many different opinions in the U.S. press as you care to look for.

Then the Guatemalan representative cites American companies, and, of course, they do not speak with the voice of authority.

Finally, he refers to Mr. Patterson [Richard C. Patterson, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from October 1948 until March 1951]. Well, Mr. Patterson does not hold office under this administration. He has never held office under this administration. Whatever he says is entirely on his own authority as an individual, and just as I will not judge the opinion of the Guatemalan Government about the United States on the basis of what some individual Guatemalan may say, so I will ask the Guatemalan representative not to judge the U.S. opinion about Guatemala on the basis of what some individual citizen of the United States may say.

I would like to point out that the Guatemalan representative has never produced any names or dates or other specific indications showing that the State Department has ever acted in an improper manner.

Now, this discussion began with a speech of Ambassador Castillo-Arriola which, as I say, was correct in tone. Then came the unspeakable libels against my country by the representative of the Soviet Union, which, in the words that Sir Gladwyn Jebb used last autumn, make me think that his reason must be swamped when he says things like that about the United States.

Then, as a climax, we had the crude performance in the gallery—a sequence which I fear is not without significance. Of course, anyone is capable of filling the galleries with paid demonstrators, and we hope that the Communists who think this is such clever politics will outgrow it after a while. It may take time.

No Satellites in OAS

The representative of the Soviet Union said that the United States is the master of the Organization of American States. When he says that, he is not reflecting on us. He is reflecting on himself, because it shows that he cannot conceive of any human relationship that is not the relationship of master and servant. He cannot conceive of a relationship in which there is a rule of live and let live, in which people are equals and in which people get along by accommodation and by respecting each other.

He can just imagine what would happen to somebody who raised his voice against the Soviet Union in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Estonia, or one of those countries, and compare that with the way in which representatives of smaller countries in the United Nations constantly disagree with the United States—and they are welcome to do it. We have no satellites and we do not want any; and we do not desire to set up a monolithic structure in the free world.

Then the Soviet representative said that the United States prepared this armed intervention. That is flatly untrue. I will challenge him to prove it—and he cannot do so.

It is interesting to me, who spent 13 years of my life in the United States Senate, to come here and find that in the person of the representative of the Soviet Union we have such an outstanding authority on the United States Senate. Apparently, he knows all. Though he never has set foot inside the place, he apparently knows much more about the United States Senate than men who have been members of it for many years. When he infers that the Senators of the United States allow their official actions to be determined in accordance with their private financial interests, he is making an accusation which not only reflects no credit upon himself but which reflects a grave doubt on the wisdom and the good intent and the sincerity of every policy which his Government advocates here today.

I will call his attention to the fact that I was in the Senate at the beginning of World War II when the Senate voted the Lend-Lease Bill whereby the United States aided the Soviet Union in its fight to repel Nazi imperialism. At that time we did not hear anything out of the Soviet Union criticizing the motives of the Senators of the United States who were then voting to help the Soviet Union.

Now, the men who are in the United States Senate today are precisely the same kind of men who voted to help the Soviet Union. If they were good enough then to help the Soviet Union, they are good enough now to stand up for the interests of their country.

I notice the representative of the Soviet Union is smiling, which leads me to believe that he does not really believe the things that he has said and that he has said them under instructions. I trust that is the case.

Now, he has told us that he intends to veto the pending resolution. That will be the second veto by the Soviet Union in 3 days. We had veto No. 59 on Friday, and now we are going to have veto No. 60 on Sunday. And, vetoing what? Vetoing a move to ask the Organization of American States to solve this problem, to try to bind up this wound in the world and then report back to the Security Council—not to relieve the Security Council of responsibility. This resolution does not do that. It just asks the Organization of American States to see what it can do to be helpful. Here it says in paragraph 2 of article 52, "the Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements"—that is, regional arrangements—"or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."

Now, at the very least, that is a harmless provision. It is an intelligent provision. It is a constructive provision. Why does the representative of the Soviet Union, whose country is thousands and thousands of miles away from here, undertake to veto a move like that? What is his interest in it? How can he possibly—how can this action of his possibly fail to make unbiased observers throughout the world come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has designs on the American Hemisphere. There is no other explanation of it. And the recent articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* which have appeared in the last 2 or 3 days give color to that assertion.

I say to you, representative of the Soviet Union, stay out of this hemisphere and don't try to start your plans and your conspiracies over here.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 22

I note specifically the cable from Mr. Toriello does not ask for another meeting of the Council.

As President of the Security Council I was very glad to respond to his request for an urgent meeting of the Council last Sunday.

The Security Council, after exhaustive discussion, by a vote of 10 to 1, voted last Sunday [June 20] that the right place to go to get peace in Guatemala is the Organization of American States, where there is both unique knowledge and authority. The one vote against this was that of the Soviet Union.

In the face of this action, therefore, those who continually seek to agitate the Guatemalan question in the Security Council will inevitably be suspected of shadow boxing—of trying to strike attitudes and issue statements for propaganda purposes.

I can understand that the Soviet Union, which, by its cynical abuse of the veto, has crudely made plain its desire to make as much trouble as possible in the Western Hemisphere, should constantly seek to bring this matter before the Security Council.

But the Government of Guatemala should not lend itself to this very obvious Communist plot, lest they appear to be a cat's paw of the Soviet conspiracy to meddle in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, as it is, many persons will wonder whether the whole imbroglio in Guatemala was not cooked up precisely for the purpose of making Communist propaganda here in the United Nations. This I am sure Mr. Toriello would not want.

The fact that it has become increasingly plain that the situation in Guatemala is clearly a civil—and not an international—war, makes it even more appropriate that the Security Council should not intervene further.

The Security Council showed last Sunday by a vote of 10 to 1 that it emphatically believed that the Organization of American States was the place to try to settle the Guatemalan problem. To fly squarely in the face of this recommendation would raise grave doubts as to the good faith of those who make such requests.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 25

Now, Gentlemen, the Government of the United States joins its colleagues in the Organization of American States in opposing the adoption of the provisional agenda. We have taken this position only after the most careful consideration. We believe that there should be great liberality with reference to the consideration of items by either the Security Council or the General Assembly, but in the present case, we believe that an issue was involved which is so fundamental that it brings into question the whole system of international peace and security which was created by the charter at San Francisco in 1945.

When the charter was being drafted, the most critical single issue was that of the relationship of the United Nations as a universal organization to regional organizations, notably the already existing Organization of American States. There were a good many days in

San Francisco when it seemed that the whole concept of the United Nations might fail of realization because of the difficulty of reconciling these two concepts of universality and regionalism. Finally, a solution was found in the formula embodied in articles 51 and 52 of the charter. Article 51 recognized the inherent right of individuals to collective self-defense, and article 52 admitted the existence of regional arrangements for dealing with such matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. Article 52 provided that the Security Council had the inherent right to investigate any dispute or situation under article 34 which might lead to international friction. While any member of the United Nations might bring any dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council under article 35, nevertheless members of the United Nations who had entered into regional arrangements should make every effort to achieve pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council. The Security Council should thus encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements.

Now, Gentlemen, by that formula a balance was struck between universality, the effectiveness of which was qualified by the veto power, and regional arrangements. The adoption of that formula permitted the charter of the United Nations to be adopted. Without that formula there would never have been a United Nations.

If the United States Senate in 1946 had thought that the United Nations Charter in effect abrogated our inter-American system, I say to you as a man with 13 years' experience in the Senate, the charter would not have received the necessary two-thirds vote. And, in my judgment, the American people feel the same way today.

Translating a Formula Into a Reality

Now for the first time, the United Nations faces the problem of translating that formula from one of words into one of reality. The problem is as critical as that which faced the founders at San Francisco in 1945. Let us not delude ourselves. If it is not now possible to make a living reality of the formula which made possible the adoption of the charter, then the United Nations will have destroyed itself in 1954 as it would have been destroyed still-born in 1945 had not the present formula been devised primarily under the creative effort of the late Senator Vandenberg and the present Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, working with Secretary Stettinius and other administration leaders. It was this formula which secured bipartisan support in the United States in 1946. And I note by a completely bipartisan vote the Senate today declared that the international Communist movement must be kept out of this hemisphere.

So much for the part of the United States in what happened at San Francisco.

The great weight of the effort at San Francisco, however, was made by the other American Republics, as you have heard Ambassador Gouthier and Ambassador Echeverri say before me. The representatives of the other American Republics were determined that the United Nations should be supplementary and not in substitution or impairment of the tried and trusted regional relationships of their own.

The United States, which took such an active part in drafting the charter provisions in question, soberly believes that, if the United Nations Security Council does not respect the right of the Organization of American States to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute between Guatemala and its neighbors, the result will be a catastrophe of such dimensions as will gravely impair the future effectiveness, both of the United Nations itself and of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States. And that is precisely what I believe to be the objective of the Soviet Union in this case. Otherwise, why is he so terribly intent upon doing this?

The present charter provisions were drafted with particular regard for the Organization of American States, which constitutes the oldest, the largest, and the most solid regional organization that the world has ever known. The distinctive relationship of the American States dates back to the early part of the last century. Throughout this period of over 130 years, there has been a steady development of ever closer relations between the 21 American Republics. They have achieved a relationship which has preserved relative peace and security in this hemisphere and a freedom from the type of wars which have so cruelly devastated the peoples of Europe and Asia. The Organization of American States is an organization founded upon the freedom-loving traditions of Bolivar, of Washington, and of Abraham Lincoln.

The 21 American Republics have been bound together by a sense of distinctive destiny, by a determination to prevent the extension to this hemisphere of either the colonial domain of European powers or the political system of European despotism. They have repeatedly pledged themselves to settle their own disputes as between themselves and to oppose the interposition into their midst of non-American influences, many of which were abhorrent to the ideals which gave birth to the American Republics and which sustained them in their determination to find a better international relationship than has yet been achieved at the universal level.

Evidence of Communist Intervention

There has recently been evidence that international communism, in its lust for world domination, has been seeking to gain control of the

political institutions of the American States in violation of the basic principles which have from the beginning inspired them freely to achieve their own destiny and mission in the world.

Now it is our belief that the great bulk of the people of Guatemala are opposed to the imposition upon them of the domination of alien despotism and have manifested their resistance just as have many other countries which international communism sought to make its victim. The Government of Guatemala claims that the fighting now going on there is the result of an aggression by Honduras and Nicaragua. It claims that it is a victim. It asks for an investigation. It is entitled to have the facts brought to light. The procedures for doing that are clearly established within the regional Organization of American States. These states have established a permanent Inter-American Peace Committee to handle problems of this nature. Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua all applied to that Committee for assistance in resolving this problem. The Committee has agreed to send a fact-finding committee to the area of controversy for that purpose. Guatemala has attempted to interrupt this wholesome process by first withdrawing its petition, and, second, by withholding its consent for the fact-finding committee to proceed with its task. Nevertheless, because the members of the Committee feel that it is inconceivable that Guatemala will obstruct the very investigation for which she has been clamoring for days, the Committee is firmly and vigorously preparing to proceed to the area of controversy.

The Government of Guatemala has regularly exercised the privileges and enjoyed all the advantages of membership in the Organization of American States, including those of attending and voting in its meetings. It is obligated by article 52, paragraph 2 of the charter, to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements." Its efforts to bypass the Organization of American States is in substance a violation of article 52, paragraph 2.

We hear today that Guatemala, after years of posing as a member of that Organization, now for the first time claims that she is not technically a member thereof. To have claimed and to have exercised all the privileges of membership for a number of years and then to disclaim the obligations and responsibilities is an example of duplicity which surely the Security Council should not condone. Either Guatemala is a member of the Organization of American States and therefore bound by article 52, paragraph 2, or else it is guilty of duplicity such that it cannot come before the Security Council with clean hands.

Now, if we adopt the agenda, we in effect give one state, in this case Guatemala, a veto on the Organization of American States. It is not possible to do both. You do one at the expense of the other in this case.

In any event, the United States is a member of the Organization of American States, and as such we are clearly bound by article 52, paragraph 2 of the charter. The United States is also bound by article 20 of the charter of the Organization of American States which provides:

All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in the Charter before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Well, that has been so for a long time.

The United States does not deny the propriety of this danger to the peace from Guatemala being brought to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with article 35 of the charter, and that has been done. As I said, I called the meeting the day after I received the message. The United States is, however, both legally and as a matter of honor bound by its undertakings contained in article 52, paragraph 2, of the charter and in article 20 of the charter of the Organization of American States to oppose Security Council consideration of this Guatemalan dispute upon the agenda of the Security Council until the matter has first been dealt with by the Organization of American States, which through its regularly constituted agencies is dealing actively with the problem now.

The United States is in this matter moved by more than legal or technical considerations, and I recognize that. We do not lightly oppose consideration of any matter by the Security Council. We are, however, convinced that a failure by the Security Council to observe the restraints which were spelled out in the charter will be a grave blow to the entire system of international peace and security which the United Nations was designed to achieve.

The proposal of Guatemala, supported most actively by the Soviet Union, which in this matter has already passed its 60th veto, is an effort to create international anarchy rather than international order. International communism seeks to win for itself support by constantly talking about its love of peace and international law and order. In fact, it is the promoter of international disorder.

Gentlemen, this organization is faced by the same challenge which faced the founders at San Francisco in 1945. The task then was to find the words which would constitute a formula of reconciliation between universality and regionalism. And now the issue is whether those words will be given reality or whether they will be ignored. If they be ignored, the result will be to disturb the delicate but precious balance between regional and universal organizations and to place one against the other in a controversy which may well be fatal to them both.

The balance struck by the charter was achieved at San Francisco in the face of violent opposition of the Soviet Union at that time. It

sought from the beginning to secure for the Security Council, where it had the veto power, a monopoly of authority to deal with international disputes. Today international communism uses Guatemala as the tool whereby it can gain for itself the privileges which it was forced to forego at San Francisco. I say with all solemnity that, if the Security Council is the victim of that strategy and assumes jurisdiction over disputes which are the proper responsibility of regional organizations of a solid and serious character, then the clock of peace will have been turned back and disorder will replace order.

The Guatemalan complaint can be used, as it is being used, as a tool to violate the basic principles of our charter. It is to prevent that result, which would set in motion a chain of disastrous events, that the United States feels compelled to oppose the adoption of the provisional agenda containing the Guatemalan complaint and appeals to the other members to join with us in avoiding a step which, under the guise of plausibility and liberality, will, in fact, engage this organization in a course so disorderly and so provocative of jurisdictional conflict that the future of both the United Nations and of the Organization of American States may be compromised and a grave setback given to the developing processes of international order.

U. S. SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 91

Approved June 25, 1954

Whereas for many years it has been the joint policy of the United States and the other States in the Western Hemisphere to act vigorously to prevent external interference in the affairs of the nations of the Western Hemisphere; and

Whereas in the recent past there has come to light strong evidence of intervention by the international Communist movement in the State of Guatemala, whereby government institutions have been infiltrated by Communist agents, weapons of war have been secretly shipped into that country, and the pattern of Communist conquest has become manifest; and

Whereas on Sunday, June 20, 1954, the Soviet Government vetoed in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to refer the matter of the recent outbreak of hostilities in Guatemala to the Organization of American States: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the United States should reaffirm its support of the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity of March 28, 1954, which is designed to prevent interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international Communist movement, and take all necessary and proper steps to support the Organization of American States in taking appropriate action to prevent any interference by the international Communist movement in the affairs of the States of the Western Hemisphere.

THE GUATEMALAN PROBLEM BEFORE THE OAS COUNCIL

Statement by John C. Dreier, U. S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States, June 28, 1954

I speak today as the representative of one of 10 American countries who have joined in a request that a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be convoked to act as Organ of Consultation under articles 6 and 11 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. On behalf of the United States I wish to support this request with all the force and conviction that I can express, feeling profoundly as I and my countrymen do that this is a critical hour in which a strong and positive note of inter-American solidarity must be sounded.

The Republics of America are faced at this time with a serious threat to their peace and independence. Throughout the world the aggressive forces of Soviet Communist imperialism are exerting a relentless pressure upon all free nations. Since 1939, 15 once free nations have fallen prey to the forces directed by the Kremlin. Hundreds of millions of people in Europe and Asia have been pressed into the slavery of the Communist totalitarian state. Subversion, civil violence, and open warfare are the proven methods of this aggressive force in its ruthless striving for world domination.

Following World War II, in which millions of men died to free the world from totalitarianism, the forces of Communist imperialism took on a freshly aggressive aspect. The first objectives of this new drive for domination were the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Efforts to overcome Greece and Iran failed because of the heroic resistance of peoples whose courage not only gave them strength to defend their independence but also brought them the moral and material support of other countries directly and through international organizations.

Communist forces then turned their attention to Asia. Following the fall of China came the stark aggression of the Korean war where once more the united forces of the free world, acting through the United Nations, stemmed the tide of Soviet Communist imperialism.

More recently, we have seen the combination of Communist subversion and political power, backed with weapons from the Communist arsenal, strike deep into Southeast Asia and threaten to engulf another populous area of the world as it emerges from colonialism.

And now comes the attack on America.

Until very recently we of the Americas, here in our continental bastion, have felt ourselves relatively far from the field of open conflict. To be sure, in all our countries the international Communist organization has for some time undertaken its insidious work of attempting to undermine our institutions and to achieve positions of influence in public and private organizations. But only within the last few years has there been evidence of a real success on the part of the international Communist organization in carrying to this hemisphere the plagues of internal strife, and subservience to a foreign imperialism, which had previously been inflicted upon other areas of the world. That success marks the problem for which the treaty of Rio de Janeiro is now invoked as a measure of continental defense.

Mr. Chairman, this is not the time and place in which to enter into a discussion of the substance of the problem which will be placed before the Organ of Consultation when it meets. At this time it is the function of the Council merely to consider the validity of the request that the Organ of Consultation be convoked.

In support of the request for a meeting, I should like to cite briefly the following compelling arguments.

Anti-Communist Declarations

First, the American Republics have several times during recent years clearly and unequivocally stated their opposition to the objectives and methods of the international Communist movement which, by its very nature, is incompatible with the high principles that govern the international relations of the American States. This viewpoint was clearly enunciated at the Ninth Inter-American Conference, which in Resolution 32 declared that by its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist tendency the political activity of international communism was incompatible with the concept of American freedom. This thought was echoed at the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers which, furthermore, pointed out that the subversive action of international communism recognized no frontiers and called for a high degree of international cooperation among the American Republics against the danger which such actions represented.

Only a few months ago at Caracas the American States expressed their determination to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of international communism, and declared that the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America.

There is no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that it is the declared policy of the American States that the establishment of a government dominated by the international Communist movement in America would constitute a grave danger to all our American Republics and that steps must be taken to prevent any such eventuality.

Communist Penetration in Guatemala

Second, I should like to affirm the fact that there is already abundant evidence that the international Communist movement has achieved an extensive penetration of the political institutions of one American State, namely the Republic of Guatemala, and now seeks to exploit that country for its own ends. This assertion, which my Government is prepared to support with convincing detail at the right time, is clearly warranted by the open opposition of the Guatemalan Government to any form of inter-American action that might check or restrain the progress of the international Communist movement in this continent; by the open association of that Government with the policies and objectives of the Soviet Union in international affairs; by the evidences of close collaboration of the authorities in Guatemala and authorities in Soviet-dominated states of Europe for the purpose of obtaining under secret and illegal arrangements the large shipment of arms which arrived on board the *M/S Alfhem* on May 15, 1954; by the efforts of Guatemala in the United Nations Security Council, in collaboration with the Soviet Union, to prevent the Organization of American States, the appropriate regional organization, from dealing with her recent allegations of aggression, and finally by the vigorous and sustained propaganda campaign of the Soviet press and radio, echoed by the international Communist propaganda machine throughout the world in support of Guatemalan action in the present crisis.

The recent outbreak of violence in Guatemala adds a further sense of urgency to the matter. We well know from experience in other areas into which the international Communist movement has penetrated the tragic proportions to which this inevitable violent conflict may ultimately extend.

The above facts, Mr. Chairman, I submit, are more than enough to demonstrate the need for a prompt meeting of the Organ of Consultation as has been proposed in the note which was read at this meeting today.

Within the last 24 hours it appears that there has been a change in the Government of Guatemala. It is not possible, however, in the opinion of my Government, to arrive at any considered judgment of how this change may affect the problem with which we are concerned. Under the circumstances, it would appear to be essential that we do not relax our efforts at this moment, but proceed with our plans in order to be ready for any eventuality. At the same time, we should of course

all watch developments in Guatemala carefully and be prepared subsequently to take whatever steps may prove necessary in the light of future events.

I should like to emphasize the fact that the object of our concern, and the force against which we must take defensive measures, is an alien, non-American force. It is the international Communist organization controlled in the Kremlin which has created the present danger. That it is rapidly making a victim of one American State increases our concern for that country and our determination to unite in a defense of all 21 of our American nations. We are confident that the international Communist movement holds no real appeal for the peoples of America and can only subdue them if allowed to pursue its violent and deceitful methods unchecked. Having read the tragic history of other nations seduced by Communist promises into a slavery from which they later could not escape, we wish to leave no stone unturned, no effort unexerted, to prevent the complete subordination of one of our member states to Soviet Communist imperialism. For when one state has fallen, history shows that another will soon come under attack.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in the Americas we have established ways for dealing with these problems that affect the common safety. We are pledged to maintain continental peace and security through our solidarity expressed in consultation and joint effort. In the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance we have the vehicle through which we can merge our individual efforts in order to take the measures necessary for the maintenance of continental peace and security. The meeting of the Organ of Consultation which we request here today is in fulfillment of the principles and procedures which the American Republics have laid down for dealing with threats to their independence, sovereignty, and peace. If that system of international relations of which the peoples of this hemisphere are so rightfully proud is to endure, it must resolutely meet the challenge which Soviet Communist imperialism has now thrown down to it.

If we take a valiant course and courageously face the danger which menaces us we will again prove, as America has proved in the past, the power of our united will. That, I am sure, we shall do because of what is at stake. There hang in the balance not only the security of this continent but the continued vitality and existence of the Organization of American States and the high principles upon which it is founded. In our decisions at this hour we may well profoundly affect the future of our American way of life.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that this Council promptly approve the proposal that the Organ of Consultation be invoked; that the date be set as of July 7 next; and that the decision be taken here and now so that

the entire world may be given evidence of our determination to act effectively in the present crisis.¹

¹ The Council voted on June 28 to convoke a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro on July 7. On July 2, following the cease-fire in Guatemala on June 29 and the reaching of a settlement on July 1, the Council decided to postpone the Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

Radio and Television Address by Secretary Dulles, June 30, 1954

Tonight I should like to talk with you about Guatemala. It is the scene of dramatic events. They expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system, and they test the ability of the American States to maintain the peaceful integrity of this hemisphere.

For several years international communism has been probing here and there for nesting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics.

This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies.

It is interesting to recall that the menace which brought that doctrine into being was itself a menace born in Russia. It was the Russian Czar Alexander and his despotic allies in Europe who, early in the last century, sought control of South America and the western part of North America. In 1823 President Monroe confronted this challenge with his declaration that the European despots could not "extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness. We would not," he said, "behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

These sentiments were shared by the other American Republics, and they were molded into a foreign policy of us all. For 131 years that policy has well served the peace and security of this hemisphere. It serves us well today.

In Guatemala, international communism had an initial success. It began 10 years ago, when a revolution occurred in Guatemala. The revolution was not without justification. But the Communists seized on it, not as an opportunity for real reform, but as a chance to gain political power.

Communist agitators devoted themselves to infiltrating the public and private organizations of Guatemala. They sent recruits to Russia and other Communist countries for revolutionary training and indoctrination in such institutions as the Lenin School at Moscow. Operating in the guise of "reformers" they organized the workers and peasants under Communist leadership. Having gained control of what they call "mass organizations," they moved on to take over the official

press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program. Through the technique of the "popular front" they dictated to the Congress and the President.

The judiciary made one valiant attempt to protect its integrity and independence. But the Communists, using their control of the legislative body, caused the Supreme Court to be dissolved when it refused to give approval to a Communist-contrived law. Arbenz, who until this week was President of Guatemala, was openly manipulated by the leaders of communism.

Guatemala is a small country. But its power, standing alone, is not a measure of the threat. The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid political base in this hemisphere, a base that can be used to extend Communist penetration to the other peoples of the other American Governments. It was not the power of the Arbenz government that concerned us but the power behind it.

If world communism captures any American State, however small, a new and perilous front is established which will increase the danger to the entire free world and require even greater sacrifices from the American people.

The Declaration at Caracas

This situation in Guatemala had become so dangerous that the American States could not ignore it. At Caracas last March the American States held their Tenth Inter-American Conference. They then adopted a momentous statement. They declared that "the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement . . . would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America."

There was only one American State that voted against this declaration. That State was Guatemala.

This Caracas declaration precipitated a dramatic chain of events. From their European base the Communist leaders moved rapidly to build up the military power of their agents in Guatemala. In May a large shipment of arms moved from behind the Iron Curtain into Guatemala. The shipment was sought to be secreted by false manifests and false clearances. Its ostensible destination was changed three times while en route.

At the same time, the agents of international communism in Guatemala intensified efforts to penetrate and subvert the neighboring Central American States. They attempted political assassinations and political strikes. They used consular agents for political warfare.

Many Guatemalan people protested against their being used by Communist dictatorship to serve the Communists' lust for power. The response was mass arrests, the suppression of constitutional guar-

anties, the killing of opposition leaders, and other brutal tactics normally employed by communism to secure the consolidation of its power.

In the face of these events and in accordance with the spirit of the Caracas declaration, the nations of this hemisphere laid further plans to grapple with the danger. The Arbenz government responded with an effort to disrupt the inter-American system. Because it enjoyed the full support of Soviet Russia, which is on the Security Council, it tried to bring the matter before the Security Council. It did so without first referring the matter to the American regional organization as is called for both by the United Nations Charter itself and by the treaty creating the American organization.

The Foreign Minister of Guatemala openly connived in this matter with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. The two were in open correspondence and ill-concealed privacy. The Security Council at first voted overwhelmingly to refer the Guatemalan matter to the Organization of American States. The vote was 10 to 1. But that one negative vote was a Soviet veto.

Then the Guatemalan Government, with Soviet backing, redoubled its efforts to supplant the American States system by Security Council jurisdiction.

However, last Friday, the United Nations Security Council decided not to take up the Guatemalan matter but to leave it in the first instance to the American States themselves. That was a triumph for the system of balance between regional organization and world organization, which the American States had fought for when the charter was drawn up at San Francisco.

The American States then moved promptly to deal with the situation. Their peace commission left yesterday for Guatemala. Earlier the Organization of American States had voted overwhelmingly to call a meeting of their Foreign Ministers to consider the penetration of international communism in Guatemala and the measures required to eliminate it. Never before has there been so clear a call uttered with such a sense of urgency and strong resolve.

Attempt To Obscure Issue

Throughout the period I have outlined, the Guatemalan Government and Communist agents throughout the world have persistently attempted to obscure the real issue—that of Communist imperialism—by claiming that the United States is only interested in protecting American business. We regret that there have been disputes between the Guatemalan Government and the United Fruit Company. We have urged repeatedly that these disputes be submitted for settlement to an international tribunal or to international arbitration. That is the way to dispose of problems of this sort. But this issue is relatively unimportant. All who know the temper of the U. S. people

and Government must realize that our overriding concern is that which, with others, we recorded at Caracas, namely the endangering by international communism of the peace and security of this hemisphere.

The people of Guatemala have not been heard from. Despite the armaments piled up by the Arbenz government, it was unable to enlist the spiritual cooperation of the people.

Led by Col. Castillo Armas, patriots arose in Guatemala to challenge the Communist leadership—and to change it. Thus, the situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.

Last Sunday, President Arbenz of Guatemala resigned and seeks asylum. Others are following his example.

Tonight, just as I speak, Col. Castillo Armas is in conference in El Salvador with Colonel Monzón, the head of the Council which has taken over the power in Guatemala City. It was this power that the just wrath of the Guatemalan people wrested from President Arbenz, who then took flight.

Now the future of Guatemala lies at the disposal of the Guatemalan people themselves. It lies also at the disposal of leaders loyal to Guatemala who have not treasonably become the agents of an alien despotism which sought to use Guatemala for its own evil ends.

The events of recent months and days add a new and glorious chapter to the already great tradition of the American States.

Each one of the American States has cause for profound gratitude. We can all be grateful that we showed at Caracas an impressive solidarity in support of our American institutions. I may add that we are prepared to do so again at the conference called for Rio. Advance knowledge of that solidarity undoubtedly shook the Guatemalan Government.

We can be grateful that the Organization of American States showed that it could act quickly and vigorously in aid of peace. There was proof that our American organization is not just a paper organization, but that it has vigor and vitality to act.

We can be grateful to the United Nations Security Council, which recognized the right of regional organizations in the first instance to order their own affairs. Otherwise the Soviet Russians would have started a controversy which would have set regionalism against universality and gravely wounded both.

Above all, we can be grateful that there were loyal citizens of Guatemala who, in the face of terrorism and violence and against what seemed insuperable odds, had the courage and the will to eliminate the traitorous tools of foreign despots.

The need for vigilance is not past. Communism is still a menace everywhere. But the people of the United States and of the other American Republics can feel tonight that at least one grave danger

has been averted. Also an example is set which promises increased security for the future. The ambitious and unscrupulous will be less prone to feel that communism is the wave of their future.

In conclusion, let me assure the people of Guatemala. As peace and freedom are restored to that sister Republic, the Government of the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of the Guatemalan people. A prosperous and progressive Guatemala is vital to a healthy hemisphere. The United States pledges itself not merely to political opposition to communism but to help to alleviate conditions in Guatemala and elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the hemisphere. Thus we shall seek in positive ways to make our Americas an example which will inspire men everywhere.

PART TWO

THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

(Partido Guatemalteco del trabajo)

A BASIC STUDY

(Revision May 1954)

The situation in Guatemala has changed since the following documents were prepared. Nevertheless, it is the view of the Government of the United States that the free nations and peoples of the world will find these documents valuable and important as a case history of a bold attempt on the part of international communism to get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere by gaining control of the political institutions of an American Republic.

SUMMARY

The *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (The Guatemalan Labor Party—PGT), a Communist party modeled on and guided by the Soviet Communist Party, is the most influential single political organization in present-day Guatemala. Its influence on Guatemalan political life is probably greater than that exercised in any other Latin American country by any local Communist party. The characteristics of its growth and successes provide perhaps the most revealing insight into the adaptation of international Communist strategy to the Latin American environment.

The PGT is a party of young *ladino*¹ "intellectuals," of the lower middle class. Its founders and present leaders are young schoolteachers, ex-university students, journalists, white collar workers and former employees of United States and foreign enterprises in Guatemala. This was the sector of society most frustrated under the archaic social structure of Guatemala, a small Central American State of some 3,000,000 inhabitants which until after World War II remained a backward dictator-ridden agricultural country where 2 percent of the landholdings covered 70 percent of the arable land, and over half the population consisted of illiterate Indians living apart from the main currents of twentieth century life.

In the intellectually fermenting years of the 1930's and of World War II, many of these intellectuals became attracted to nationalism and Marxism as offering a way out for Guatemala.

The mold of the Guatemalan Communist movement was the 1944 revolution and the 1945-51 administration of President Juan José Arévalo, a self-proclaimed "spiritual socialist" schoolteacher. The revolution, which overthrew the last vestiges of the 13-year regime of Gen. Jorge Ubico, originally had the support of all of the middle classes but its leading element was the lower middle class intellectual group which sought to apply their nationalist and Marxist theories to bring about Guatemala's social transformation. Conscious of inexperience, they relied heavily for direction in labor and political organization on foreigners and Guatemalan exiles who had been involved in Communist activities in Latin America and who flocked to Guatemala after the 1944 revolution, largely unnoticed by the out-

side world. These Communist personalities, including such figures as Alfonso Solórzano, a Guatemalan labor lawyer closely associated with Vicente Lombardo Toledano in Mexico, and Miguel Marmol, a Salvadoran labor organizer, educated a younger generation of native Guatemalan "intellectuals" in Communist doctrine by such devices as establishing an indoctrination school in the new National Labor Federation, disseminating Communist propaganda in the administration's "revolutionary" political parties and establishing Marxist "study groups."

Guatemala's postwar Communist party crystallized as a clandestine organization hidden within the Guatemalan "revolutionary" parties and labor unions supporting the Arévalo administration. According to its present leaders, it was first successfully founded on September 28, 1947, under the name of the *Vanguardia Democrática* as the precursor of the Guatemalan Communist Party which held its first congress 2 years later. Its leader from 1948 onward was José Manuel Fortuny, then a 32-year-old ex-law student, former radio newscaster, and ex-employee of the British Legation and of an American company, Sterling Products, Inc. At the time, he was ostensibly an officer of the *Partido Acción Revolucionaria* (PAR), a leading-administration party. Other probable members of the first clandestine Communist organization were also members of the PAR, the other administration parties, and the labor unions. On September 28, 1949, a day from which the present Communist Party dates its anniversaries, this secret Communist group held its First Party Congress and adopted the name of *Partido Comunista de Guatemala* (PCG). But it was not until May 1950, in the last year of the Arévalo administration, that Fortuny and his group withdrew from the PAR. The following month they founded a newspaper, *Octubre*, as the frank precursor of an open Communist party, and at the same time Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, a 29-year-old schoolteacher turned labor leader, founded a Communist-line party under the title of the *Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala* (The Revolutionary Workers Party of Guatemala—PROG).

When Col. Jacobo Arbenz, a radical leftist-nationalist army officer, assumed the Presidency on March 15, 1951, the PCG began to make rapid strides toward becoming an open party. In April Fortuny began publicly signing documents as "Secretary General of the *Partido Comunista de Guatemala*." In June, on the first anniversary of the newspaper *Octubre*, the PCG held a public ceremony attended by several high government figures and proclaimed its intention to become a legally registered party. In October, Guatemala's labor unions were consolidated into the *Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (CGTG) with Gutiérrez, by that time an avowed Communist, as its Secretary General. In January 1952, after

¹ A *ladino* in Guatemala is a person who has adopted European cultural standards (e. g., Western dress) and may be racially a pure Indian as well as a person of mixed blood.

a trip to Moscow, Gutiérrez dissolved his PROG and joined the PCG which shortly thereafter achieved recognition in the *Cominform Journal* published in Bucharest. In October, the party was included with the other administration parties in the "Democratic Electoral Front" for the impending congressional elections. In December, the party held its Second Party Congress, changed its name to the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT), and was shortly thereafter entered on the Civil Registry as a legally constituted political party.

The PGT, as it thus emerged, is a Communist party modeled on the Soviet Communist Party of the Stalinist era. Its statutes concentrate power in the hands of the Secretary General and the Political Committee whose dictates are binding on subordinate regional party organizations and cells (Basic Organizations) which are scattered through most of Guatemala with the heaviest concentration in the capital.

Statistics on party membership have never been made public, but the best evidence in the spring of 1954 indicates that 3,000 would be a minimum and 4,000 a likely figure. In addition to registered PGT members, however, there is an indeterminate number of influential intellectual Communists who have apparently not joined Fortuny's PGT and sometimes appear to be quarreling with it on organizational and tactical grounds though not on ultimate objectives.

The PGT leadership, headed by Fortuny as party Secretary General, consists of characteristically young *ladinos* of the lower middle class. The known ages of the 11-man Political Committee range from Fortuny's 37 to 24, with the exception of one member who is 47. Seven of the 11 were university students or schoolteachers (some with sidelines in journalism or office work) before entering politics while the remaining four were skilled workers including a printer, a carpenter, and a tailor. There are no pure Indians and none who have been previously employed in industry or transportation.

The party leadership is closely tied to Moscow. Fortuny and at least 5 others of the 11 on the Political Committee have visited Moscow and the key personnel of the Communist-controlled labor and "mass organizations" have also been there. There is a constant flow of propaganda material and instructions from Moscow and from the Soviet-controlled international labor and "mass" organizations to Guatemala.

The PGT publicly recognizes its debt to what it terms the "example" of the Soviet Communist Party and its aims and tactics must be viewed in the framework of the orthodox Communist thesis of the "inevitable victory" of communism throughout the world rather than on the local plane of gaining control of the Guatemalan Government as quickly as possible. In international affairs, the party has emphasized as its first task the "Peace" campaign which is defined as prevent-

ing the harnessing of Guatemala to the "war chariot of imperialism"—i. e. preventing Guatemala from taking its role in the defense of the Western democratic community grouped around the United States. As the corollary in domestic Guatemalan politics the PGT has announced as its first task the implementation of Guatemala's 1952 Agrarian Reform Law which is designed to transfer much of the country's potential arable land to new small farmers, and as its second the heightening of the struggle against United States "monopolistic" companies operating in Guatemala. These domestic programs tend toward the breakdown of the established order and are thus simultaneously adapted to the immediate objective of weakening Guatemala's position in the Western community and the ultimate objective of preparing the ground for the Communists' coming to power.

The PGT leadership attempts to achieve its objectives largely through indirect influence and control over government agencies, political and labor organizations, and Communist-front youth, students', and women's pressure groups. In the government, as illustrated by its 1951-54 growth, the party's chief asset is the sympathy of President Arbenz, with whose approval key government posts are filled with party workers and sympathizers. A key instrument is the "National Democratic Front," the formal alliance of the political parties and labor organizations supporting Arbenz which is dominated by the Communists and has all but replaced the Cabinet as a policy making agency. The National Agrarian Department is the stronghold of avowed PGT members; the government educational and propaganda systems have been infiltrated with numbers of Communists; and the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security with its large cash income is dominated by Solórzano and his group.

The PGT's ability to influence the government is greatly enhanced by its control and influence over organized Guatemalan labor which takes in well over 100,000 workers as compared to a total vote in the 1950 presidential elections of 415,000. In the CGTG, the Secretary General is Gutiérrez, head of the PGT Central Committee's Labor Union Commission, and most of the officers in key positions on the Executive Committee are PGT members and the party's control of the organization is effective. To a somewhat lesser extent, the PGT exerts influence over the *Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala* (CNCG), the national federation of small farmers, tenants, and those organized farm laborers not incorporated in the CGTG. Its principal leaders have been associated with such Communist causes as the "Peace" movement and its program is closely in line with those of the PGT.

The principal "mass" organizations which support the party's efforts are the National Peace Committee, whose Secretary General is Mario Silva Jonama, Secretary of the PGT and head of its Edu-

cation Commission; the *Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala* (AJDG), the youth organization whose Secretary General is Edelberto Torres Rivas, a 1953 visitor to Moscow, and one of whose most influential leaders is Huberto Alvarado, member of the PGT Central Committee and head of its Youth Commission; and the *Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca* (AFG), the women's organization whose Secretary General is Dora Franco y Franco, a Communist and one of whose founding members was Sra. de Arbenz. These organizations with the aid of the administration parties and the labor unions have recently set themselves a goal of 125,000 signatures on a "Peace" petition, thus giving an indication of their ability to simulate "mass support" for Communistic causes.

The PGT has thus become in 1954 the most influential single organization in Guatemalan political life and has established its dominion over the key institutions in Guatemalan political life, with the exception of the armed forces, which, however, have not opposed communism. The momentum it has achieved indicates further successes unless there is a change in the world situation or a successful but unforeseeable revolt by the Guatemalan Army or some other group. The party still has a few weaknesses: It still relies to a great extent on the good will of the Guatemalan President and his replacement by one less sympathetic to communism would be a serious blow; it is still faced to some extent with the danger that the Guatemalan revolution will turn into opportunist un-Communist channels since the indoctrination of most of the current sympathizers outside of the party is only superficial; and in the last analysis it is dependent on the international Communist movement for guidance and cohesion and probably could not long survive a major Soviet setback. However, the PGT has the salient advantage that it alone has the political initiative with the administration parties tending increasingly to follow in its ideological wake while the opposition has for the past 18 months increasingly become sterile and ineffectual. Moreover, the path of agrarian reform and extreme nationalism on which the Arbenz administration has hurried has been directed at breaking down the existing order without an immediate substitute, a situation which cannot but enhance the Communist position.

Section I

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISM

A. THE "INTELLECTUAL" STRATUM AS THE INCUBATOR OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1. *The Guatemalan Environment*: The post World War II Communist movement in Guatemala crystallized in one small segment of the social organism, the lower middle class *ladino* "intellectual" group of schoolteachers, poor students, journalists and the like, and this did much to shape its future growth. The appeal of communism to this group may be traced to its frustration at the failure of the Guatemalan community to make substantial progress for at least two generations prior to World War II in adjusting its political, social, and economic structure in harmony with the ideals of the modern world.

Guatemala remained until after World War II essentially a backward coffee-growing agricultural country in which a few landlords controlled large groups of illiterate Indian laborers. The 1,500,000 Indians who make up half of the country's population,¹ according to recent anthropological surveys, have continued to live separated from the main currents of modern life, entrenched in ancient customs traceable to the Maya era. The country's population (about 2,800,000) and its area (about 42,000 square miles) are both roughly comparable to those of the State of Tennessee, but in 1948 the per capita share of the gross national product in Guatemala was less than one-tenth that in the United States. Illiteracy, by Guatemalan statistical standards, still stands at about 70 percent and probably less than 5 percent of the adult male population has an education comparable to a U. S. high school education. The bases of the society, in short, changed very little in the 4 centuries since the Spanish Conquest in 1529 despite some abortive efforts at modernization in the late nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries.

Conditions in Guatemala, furthermore, were materially different than those which led to the growth of Communist parties in Western Europe. The Guatemalan society, despite its social backwardness,

¹ The 1950 Guatemalan census gives 54 percent as the percentage of Indians in the country, based on cultural rather than racial characteristics. Anthropologists generally agree that the percentage of pure or nearly pure Indians is higher. The remainder of the population is considered in the census as *ladinos*, that is persons of European culture, most but not all of whom are of mixed Spanish and Indian blood.

had no true tradition of social revolution, although like other Latin American countries it had its share of "revolutions" which were seldom more than military coups transferring power from one clique to another. The landowning classes and the bulk of the middle classes were unresponsive to the broad appeal of social change and resistant to the narrower attraction of communism, and there was no industrial proletariat to speak of. There was no corps of experienced, Moscow-trained Communists to take charge of developments nor an underground party. The Marxist-oriented among the lower middle class, thus, represented virtually the only element in the social environment favorable for the cultivation of a Communist growth.

2. *Attempts at Social Transformations (1870-1932)*: In the last two generations before World War II there were several unsuccessful efforts to overcome the archaic structure of Guatemalan society. The first of significance was made by Gen. Justo Rufino Barrios, dominant figure of Guatemalan politics from 1871 to 1885 and President for the last 11 of those years. This was a time when Guatemala was beginning to feel the impact of the ideas of the liberal revolutions and movements that had swept across the Western World in the previous half century with the industrial revolution and when the feudal society established with the Spanish Conquest was weakened. Barrios, a dictator, attempted a start at bringing Guatemala into line with the thought of his day by fostering an embryonic state school system, severely restricting the temporal power of the church, establishing a national military academy, improving communications, and other reforms.

Despite his efforts, Barrios did not succeed in overcoming the inertia of society. In his effort to establish a businesslike agricultural structure he expropriated communal lands of the Indians, pieced together large plantations, introduced the commercial growth of coffee, and encouraged immigration to develop the new economy. The probably unforeseen result was that the Indian further lost his independence and became to a large extent the victim of "debt-slavery." The decaying landowner-Indian relationship of the Spanish heritage was thus revived and perpetuated in another form.

Barrios also established the first of a long series of "Liberal" authoritarian regimes which were to last through the era of Gen. Jorge Ubico (1932-44). Ironically, the professed admiration of Barrios and some of his "Liberal" successors for U. S. and Western European democracy (July 4 and July 14 have since been maintained as Guatemalan national holidays) was later to prove a factor in turning the intellectuals opposing the "Liberal" dictatorships away from Western democracy.

After Barrios' era, an indirect but equally unsuccessful challenge to the existing structure slowly developed in the form of a small

middle class. Without altering its basic internal structure, Guatemala assimilated in the late nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries some of the technological advances of the outer world. Foreign capital started work on, and a U. S. company completed and still owns, the International Railways of Central America (IRCA). The United Fruit Company began what was to become the largest productive enterprise in the country. Commercial products of expanding U. S. and European industries entered the Guatemalan market in increasing quantities, demands were created for modern medicine, and eventually the introduction of automobiles and airplanes began a transformation of this small mountainous country's communications.

The middle class which evolved to furnish the merchants, professional men, educators, and technicians to service these assimilations had the most contacts with the outside world and became the social stratum most conscious of Guatemala's social backwardness. However, this class eventually divided into one segment which was drawn to the idea of progress by evolutionary means and another segment drawn to reform by revolutionary means. The majority of the middle class obtained in the years 1871-1944 a sufficient stake in the economy to be content to hope for modernization by evolutionary means. The minority, made up of those "intellectual" elements such as school-teachers, whose resentment of Guatemala's backwardness was sharpened by lack of ties to the existing structure, became something of an insoluble lump in the Guatemalan social organism. This was not perhaps because of any conscious desire for separation on the part of the "intellectuals" but more probably because the archaic social structure would not provide the necessary solvent. Frustrated in their desire to provide ideological orientation to an evolutionary society, they lived traditionally on the periphery of the national life, often with makeshift personal lives and prey to the facile "isms" which seemed to provide a formula for quick solution to the problems they perceived.

3. *The Intellectuals 1932-44*: During the 1930's and World War II, when liberal ideas of social experimentation were waxing in the industrialized countries and nationalism was sweeping the underdeveloped areas, Guatemala was living under the authoritarian regime of President Ubico, and the Guatemalan lower middle class "intellectuals" who were to play a leading part in post-World War II political developments were bitterly opposed to the regime and disposed to be drawn to these "isms." Nationalism paradoxically provided much of the fertile soil from which international Communist ideology was to grow in Guatemala. The eventual contradictions between these two "isms" remained imperceptible to most of Guatemala's radical intellectuals, for nationalism with its overtones of equality and sovereignty of peoples provided a ready means to blame Guatemala's

backwardness on foreign "imperialist" exploitation while communism provided a dialectic explanation of "imperialism" and a concrete cause dedicated to overcoming it.

The thinking of Guatemala's intellectuals during the 1930's and the early 1940's thus became covered with a glaze of nationalism and Marxism, a scrambled compound which was short of the full strength of militant communism. This was the time that leading intellectuals, partly escaping the atmosphere of the Ubico regime and partly separating themselves from the frustrations of an intellectual's role in Guatemala, scattered abroad. Dr. Juan José Arévalo, the school-teacher who was to become Guatemala's first postwar "revolutionary" President, was in Argentina where he further evolved the pro-Communist ideology he was to label "spiritual socialism"; Luis Cardoza y Aragón, the leading poet and critic who was to serve many Communist-front postwar causes, was associating with leftist circles in Paris; Alfonso Solórzano Fernández, who was to play a role in the ideological orientation and organizational training of the younger Communists and who is now manager of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS), was in Mexico as a labor lawyer and organizer working directly with Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the Communist labor leader; Jorge García Granados, son of one of Guatemala's leading political families who was later to turn back to a moderate leftish line after participating in Guatemala's early postwar leftist political parties, was associating with extremist revolutionary circles in Mexico; and Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, who was to be instrumental in the organization of Guatemalan Communist-oriented groups and to rise to the presidency of the Guatemalan Congress, was a radical pro-Communist in Chile. Although several of these men were themselves moderately well to do, their Guatemalan following was drawn from the poorer students and lower middle class "intellectual" elements.

At home in Guatemala the nationalist-Marxist approach must have achieved an important role in the intellectuals' outlook, although the authoritarian Ubico regimes prevented organized expression of it. Enrique Muñoz Meany, the late pro-Communist Foreign Minister and Minister to France, taught several of Guatemala's future Communist party leaders at the law school of San Carlos University, the national university, in the early 1940's, and at the Boys Central Normal School. The fact that the University of San Carlos and the Boys Central Normal School provided from its students of the early 1940's the majority of the present leaders of the far-leftist nationalist movement and the Communist and pro-Communist organizations suggests the fashionableness of the nationalist-Marxist mode of thought in the prewar and wartime era.

World War II gave a great impetus to the revolutionary forces which were to open the way for the crystallization of an organized

Communist movement. The slogans of the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations disarmed the natural defenders of the existing Guatemalan authoritarian system and fired the ambition if not the understanding of wide segments of the middle strata of society. For many intellectuals, to judge by their subsequent writings and actions, the war was a vindication of faith in the superiority of the Socialist (i. e. Soviet) system over "Fascist dictatorship," by which they understood, with little discrimination, the Ubico authoritarian system at home and the complex police states abroad.

For another important group, the younger army officers who were also mostly recruited from the lower middle class, the war provided another type of stimulus. The presence of United States Army air bases and the sending of Guatemalan officers to United States service schools helped to focus the general dissatisfaction against the Ubico regime by contrasting the superior material status of foreign officers and the advanced technological development of a modern nation with the miserable pay and primitive methods in vogue in Guatemala.

B. THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF A GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. *Origins in the 1944 Revolution (1944-46)*: The catalyst which accelerated the ferment in the Guatemalan intellectual group and eventually molded an organized Communist movement was the Guatemalan revolutions of June and October 1944, which overthrew President Ubico and Gen. Federico Ponce Vaides, the head of the successor Provisional Government, and which ended the 70-year era dominated by "Liberal" dictatorships.

The June uprising in 1944 against President Ubico consisted almost solely of demonstrations by the students of the University of San Carlos, young teachers, and professional people; it was, in short, a revolution of "intellectuals" and not of the masses and was only partially successful. General Ponce was installed as head of the Provisional Government and soon started a policy of repression. The revolution was not made secure until October, when a second student uprising was joined by young army officers and the Provisional Government was overthrown. A governing board (Junta) consisting of Maj. Francisco Xavier Arana, who led the key *Guardia de Honor* regiment in the revolution, Capt. Jacobo Arbenz of the *Escuela Politécnica*, who was credited with being the strategist of the insurrectionists, and Jorge Toriello, a civilian, were installed as a triumvirate.

Meanwhile, following the June uprising, the intellectual group had started the organizations which were to incubate the Communist movement. Prior to the revolution no labor unions, other than con-

trolled workmen's national aid societies, had been permitted, but in July a schoolteachers' union, the *Asociación Nacional de Maestros*, was founded and evolved in January 1945 into the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Educativos de Guatemala* (STEG). The railway workers' union, SAMF, successor to an earlier railwaymen's mutual benefit society of the same initials, came into being and in August the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (CTG) was founded as the country's national labor federation. This was the time that the *Frente Popular Libertador* (FPL), the "students' party," and the *Partido Renovación Nacional* (RN), the "teachers' party," were founded with a leftist orientation in support of the presidential candidacy of Dr. Arévalo, who had returned from his exile in Argentina.

Within this leftist-nationalist movement there was at first no Communist organization. The old pre-1932 Communist Party of Guatemala had been smashed by President Ubico, who feared an uprising such as occurred in El Salvador. Several of its leaders had fled to Moscow, others had been jailed in Guatemala, and at least one, Jacobo Sánchez, had died in the hands of Ubico's police. There was thus no native organization to provide continuity and it was necessary to reconstruct the party from the base.

The seeds of the future Guatemalan Communist Party were initially planted within the CTG. In establishing and carrying forward this organization it was necessary to draw on advisers on labor organization, which Guatemala was unable to provide. Those who came forward were not from Western organizations but largely Central Americans who had had associations with communism. The principal foreign group consisted of Salvadoran exiles, including Miguel Marmol Chicas, a Salvadoran Communist who is still associated with the local labor movement; Abel and Max Cuenca Martínez, brothers exiled from El Salvador in 1932 for Communist activities, the latter of whom is now a member of the Political Committee of professedly non-Communist *Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca*; and Virgilio Guerra Méndez, now a member of the Communist *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT) Political Committee. They were joined by Antonio Ovando Sánchez, a leader of the pre-Ubico Guatemalan Communist Party who had gone to Moscow in the early 1930's and was later jailed by Ubico; and by Alfonso Solórzano Fernández, the labor lawyer who had worked with Lombardo Toledano in Mexico.

These persons, who had had labor union organizing experience in other countries, served as the advisers to the young CTG, in which they quickly established an indoctrination school called the *Escuela Claridad* with Abel Cuenca as director. Its ostensible purpose was to train labor leaders, but its Communist orientation soon became obvious. (Ovando Sánchez was quoted in 1950 as boasting that he had

begun to form the Communist Party in the *Escuela Claridad*.) The school had the close support of the schoolteachers' union, STEG, but its Communist orientation alarmed the SAMF railway union and certain other unions, with the result that a factional fight split the CTG. The SAMF and other unions withdrew to form the *Federación Sindical de Guatemala* (FSG) in January 1946, and during the same month the Arévalo administration formally shut down the *Escuela Claridad* with a decree citing it as being in contravention of article 32 of the Guatemalan Constitution, which forbids "political organizations of a foreign or international character." After the closing of the school, Communist indoctrination continued through Marxist "study groups" clandestinely organized within the labor movement and the political parties.

Communist and Communist-oriented figures also exerted an influence in the indoctrination of Guatemala's political organizations in their first years. Among the residents were Edelberto Torres, Sr., the Nicaraguan Communist; Armando Flores Amador, also a Nicaraguan Communist; Miguel Angel Vasquez, a Salvadoran Communist; Pedro Geoffrey Rivas, a Costa Rican Communist figure; and Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, a Guatemalan who had returned from Chile where he had been involved in Communist activities.

In the turbulent and disoriented first period of the post-World War II "revolutionary" era, the Communist doctrines taught by the *Escuela Claridad* in the "study groups" and by the Communist-oriented figures in the country exerted a considerable appeal to the young students and others who were looking for a unified and firm ideology. In 1944 the average known age of the present Political Committee of the Communist PGT (except Virgilio Guerra, who was 38) was just over 23 years, and their political philosophy was then probably not fully formulated. José Manuel Fortuny, the present Secretary General of the PGT, then 28, was the eldest and was employed as a part-time law student and radio newscaster. Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, the present Secretary for Organization, Alfredo Guerra Borges, now Secretary for Propaganda, and Carlos René Valle, currently on the Political Committee, were 19-year-old students at the time of the revolution. Victor Manuel Gutiérrez, now the country's top labor leader, and Mario Silva Jonama, both on the present Political Committee, were at the time of the revolution schoolteachers in their early twenties, and Carlos Manuel Pellecer, also a member of the PGT Political Committee, was 24. José Alberto Cardoza, a printer, and Antonio Ardón, a tailor, both now Political Committee members, were apparently in their mid-twenties during the revolution. All of these young men had much the same background: they were of mixed Spanish-Indian blood; their families were relatively poor, and they had attained an educational level higher than the average Guatemalan in these circumstances.

2. *Growth Inside of Political and Labor Organizations (1946-50)*: It took 3 years after the October 1944 revolution for this group to crystallize into a permanent Communist organization operating clandestinely within President Arévalo's leftist "revolutionary" movement and 7 years (until January 1952) for the *Partido Comunista de Guatemala* (PCG) to emerge as the sole and recognized Stalinist-Communist party of the country. At first one group, led by Fortuny, was active within the leftist administration parties, particularly the *Partido Acción Revolucionaria* (PAR) which was formed in 1945 by a fusion of the FPL and the RN.¹ Within the PAR they achieved a considerable influence. Fortuny was twice acting Secretary General and others of his group obtained offices on the Executive Committee.

Meantime, another group led by Gutiérrez and consisting of persons associated with the *Escuela Claridad* gradually came to dominate the labor movement. With the withdrawal of the SAMF from the CTG and the formation of the FSG in January 1946, the teachers' union STEG remained as the most militant union within the CTG and came to dominate it. Gutiérrez rose rapidly from the STEG Executive Committee to the STEG Secretary Generalship and to the Secretary Generalship of the CTG. That organization retained its original affiliation with the WFTU and the CTAL in contrast to the CIO, the AF of L, and the British Trade Unions Council which withdrew from the WFTU on the grounds that it was Soviet-dominated.

The Communist-oriented group also gradually infiltrated and won over the FSG although the FSG had originally been formed in protest to the ascendancy of Communist doctrines in the CTG. The instrument of the FSG leftist turn was Manuel Pinto Usaga, a Communist-line opportunist leader who rose from the SAMF railroad workers' union to be the FSG Secretary General, and José Alberto Cardoza. By February 1947 a *Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical* (CNUS) was founded to coordinate the actions of the CTG and FSG and lay the foundations for a new united organization. By 1950 the FSG affiliated with the WFTU and the CTAL and in October 1951 its entry into the Communist orbit was complete.

Fortuny's extreme leftist "political" group and Gutiérrez's extreme leftist "labor" group worked closely together in the revolutionary movement, and some of the younger leaders, such as José Luis Ramos, were active in both. Their activities were more in the nature of two aspects of a single current than the activities of separate entities.

In the midst of these developments, the political education of those who were to found the Communist party went forward. In addition to Solórzano, Alvarado Fuentes, and the other Guatemalan Communist-oriented personalities who had returned from exile, there was

¹ The FPL and the RN later withdrew, resulting in three parties, the PAB, the FPL, and the RN.

a large influx of visiting Communist leaders between 1945 and 1950 to help advance the ideological and organizational skill of the young Guatemalan extremists. Among them were César Godoy Urrutia, leader of the Chilean Communist Party who came first in 1945; Pablo Neruda, the Chilean Communist poet; Eduardo Hubner, a Chilean Communist figure; Virginia Bravo Letelier, a Chilean Communist teacher; Blas Roca of the Cuban Communist Party; and Vicente Lombardo Toledano of the CTAL in Mexico.

During most of these years of the development and indoctrination of the young revolutionary leaders there was no established or recognized Communist organization in Guatemala, a factor which probably eased the inner struggle of those being converted. It was an era where there could be "Communists" without any demand for them also to be "Communist Party Members."

3. *The Founding of the Communist Party in the Late Arévalo Administration (1947-51)*: Apart from the time which transpired until a Communist organization was ready to crystallize, the political climate of the Arévalo administration was not favorable for the open organization of a Communist party and the early steps toward the establishment of one were of a conspiratorial character.

President Arévalo pursued a devious and often apparently whimsical policy toward Communists which, in retrospect, may be summarized as encouraging participation of Communists as individuals in the administration political and labor groups and discouraging the formation of an open organized Stalinist party. In the organization of the first political parties and labor unions and in the evolution and early implementation of the Social Security Law (1946) and Labor Code (1947), he not only tolerated but worked closely with Communist-oriented figures. During his administration virtually all of the future Communist party leaders were at one time or another on the public payroll, one of them, Mario Silva Jonama, rising to be Under Secretary of Education, and another, Alfredo Guerra Borges, to be editor of the official gazette (then the *Diario de Centro América*). President Arévalo not only countenanced the visit of Latin American Communist figures to Guatemala, but personally aided Latin American Communists in their travels in other countries. In his political speeches and writings, the President maintained that as a "spiritual socialist" he rejected a purely materialistic (i. e. Communist) concept on the grounds that the dignity of man was more important than his economic needs, but this did not prevent him from finding a common viewpoint and a workable arrangement with Communist figures on such meeting grounds as social reform and opposition to United States "imperialism." Moreover, his talk of playing one administration political camp against another in order to retain the decisive voice for himself aided the growth of the Communist move-

ment, which benefited from the inability of most parties to forsake its support in the delicate balance.

President Arévalo, nonetheless, from time to time took concrete steps to impede the growth of an open Communist organization. In February 1946 there was his closing down of the *Escuela Olaridad*. From 1946 to 1948 and again in 1949-50 he kept Carlos Manuel Pellecer, most fiery of the young extremists, out of the country as Secretary of Legation in Paris despite Pellecer's repeated efforts to be transferred home, and the assignment of Alfredo Guerra Borges and Abel Cuenca to diplomatic missions in this period suggests further use of this device to impede Communist organization. In May 1947 he sent Abel and Max Cuenca out of the country, and on October 4 of that year his police put the Salvadoran Communists Virgilio Guerra, Miguel Marmol, and other foreign Communists across the Mexican border, thus momentarily breaking up the group that had taught at the *Escuela Claridad* and served as advisers to the CTG. (They made their way back quietly shortly thereafter.)

It was in this atmosphere that the first successful attempt to form a Guatemalan Communist Party was made on September 28, 1947, under the name of the *Vanguardia Democrática*. It was, in essence, a conspiratorial group. Its probable leaders, of whom Fortuny is the only one definitely identified, were to the outside world high officers of the PAR and the labor unions. Fortuny was formally elected Secretary General of the group in 1948. There was no announcement of its formation, and its membership, except for Fortuny, has never been revealed. In a press interview almost 4 years later, on July 1, 1951, Fortuny set the September 28, 1947, date as the day of the founding of the organized Communist party, but until 1950, the final year of Arévalo's administration, the existence of a Communist party was a successfully guarded secret.²

On December 21, 1947, young leftist followers of the administration's "revolutionary" movement, among them a group later to be identified as Communist, founded the *Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala* (AJDG), a youth organization now affiliated with the International Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFYD). One of its first leaders was José H. Zamora, a Salvadoran, who was ousted from the Secretary Generalship in 1950 and proceeded publicly to accuse Mario Silva Jonama, Antonio Sierra González, Octavio Reyes, and Huberto Alvarado of forming a Communist group within the organization. The charge suggests that

² Although Fortuny's statement dates an organized party from 1947, the present Communist Party, the PGT, dates its anniversaries from the First Party Congress on September 28, 1949. It publicized September 28, 1953, as the "Fourth Anniversary of the Party."

from the beginning the AJDG was an offshoot of the still clandestine Communist Party.

In the spring of 1949, Fortuny and Gutiérrez, both ostensibly still members of the PAR, traveled to Europe where they attended, in April, the first World Congress of the Partisans of Peace in Paris. Gutiérrez, after a brief trip back to Guatemala, also attended the Milan Congress of the WFTU, where he was elected a member of the Executive Committee and mixed further with the leaders of international communism. Fortuny, who was elected a member of the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress at Paris, went on to tour the "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe.

After their return, there was a marked increase in the tempo of the effort to create an open Communist Party. During the summer there had been the assassination of Colonel Arana, the 1944 triumvir who had become Chief of the Armed Forces, by persons sympathetic to the presidential ambitions of Colonel Arbenz, and an abortive uprising by Arana's supporters in the army which Arbenz put down with the help of labor unions. The time was propitious for the extreme left. In September 1949 Gutiérrez resigned from the PAR. During the same month, on September 28, the clandestine Communist Party, the *Vanguardia Democrática*, held its First Party Congress and purged its ranks. It was presumably at this congress that the name *Partido Comunista de Guatemala* (PCG) was adopted, and that Fortuny was reelected Secretary General. The present Guatemalan Communist Party numbers its anniversaries from this event.

On May 25, 1950, when the campaign for a successor to President Arévalo was already under way, Fortuny announced his resignation from the PAR of which he was then a member of the Executive Committee. Along with his resignation there were those of Mario Silva Jonama, PAR Secretary for Propaganda; Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, Secretary for Youth Affairs; Antonio Ardón, Secretary for Social Matters; Humberto Ortiz, Secretary for Rural Affairs; Pedro Fernandez and Alfredo Guerra Borges, ex-members of the Political Committee; and José Luis Ramos, Regilio Lopez, and Carlos René Valle. A month later, on June 21, 1950, this group brought out a newspaper entitled *Octubre* whose initial subheading was "For a Great Communist Party, Vanguard of the Workers, the Peasants and the People." The group, however, still did not openly profess themselves as the Communist Party and was known as the "*Octubre* Communists."

Fortuny's "*Octubre* Communist" group, which was then the visible manifestation of the still secret PCG, was distinct from but not opposed to another Communist political organization, the *Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala* (PROG), which was also founded in June 1950 by Gutiérrez as a Communist-type party for

the further indoctrination of political and labor leaders. It was Fortuny's idea to proceed rapidly with the establishment of an open Communist party, while Gutiérrez's statements indicate that he thought that a further period of ideological training in a Communist-front party was necessary.

The outgoing Arévalo administration did not impede these developments but it moved to dissociate the "*Octubre* Communists" from the public administration. Mario Silva Jonama was removed as Director of the national radio station TGW, where he had gone after leaving the Ministry of Education, and Alfredo Guerra Borges was dismissed as editor of the official gazette. In the summer of 1950 the Supreme Court, which was responsive to administration policy, decided that Fortuny's term on the National Electoral Council had expired, overruling his contention that he should not be limited to filling out the term of his predecessor but should have a full term.

On September 6 *Octubre* announced the founding of an evening Marxist indoctrination school named "Jacobo Sánchez," after the Communist "assassinated" by Ubico. It was under the direction of Alfredo Guerra Borges, and Gutiérrez, though not the *Octubre* group, was an instructor. The school, however, was promptly shut down by Col. Elfege Monzón, Arévalo's Minister of the Interior.

Despite these frictions with the authorities, the "*Octubre* Communists" as well as the PROG worked loyally with the revolutionary parties in the presidential campaign of Colonel Arbenz, President Arévalo's chosen successor. Leaders of these two organizations and of the trade unions under their influence formed the *Comité Político Nacional de los Trabajadores* (CPNT), which propagandized for Arbenz and the administration's congressional candidates, among the successful ones of whom were Gutiérrez and José Alberto Cardoza of the PROG, Humberto Ortiz of the *Octubre* Communists, and César Montenegro Paniagua of the FSG and SAMF who was later openly to join the Communist ranks.

4. *The Communist Party in the Arbenz Administration (1951-53)*: With the inauguration of President Arbenz on March 15, 1951, Fortuny's Communist Party started on the final phase of its emergence as an open and legal Communist Party. On April 4 Fortuny signed a press statement as "Secretary General of the *Partido Comunista de Guatemala*"; this was the first avowal that an organized Communist Party existed in Guatemala. In May there were further open contacts with international Communist figures when Lombardo Toledano, Secretary General of the CTAL, and Louis Saillant, Secretary General of WFTU, attended a Guatemalan City Conference of Latin American Land and Air Transport Workers' Unions and counseled local labor leaders on forming a single Guatemalan labor federation. On June 21, the first anniversary of the publication of

Octubre, the party held a public rally in a theater furnished by the Government under a law permitting the use of theaters for "cultural" affairs, and with high officials of the Government in attendance. It was announced that the party would seek to be entered on the Civil Registry in order to attain status as a recognized party under the electoral laws.

There remained one organizational problem to be solved: the co-existence of Fortuny's PCG and Gutiérrez's PROG, both of which were Communist in ideology but only the first of which professed itself Communist. In July, in a press interview, Gutiérrez stated flatly that he was a Communist. In October his CTG and the FSG joined in the establishment of the *Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (CGTG), and he was elected its Secretary General at the head of an Executive Committee in which the key positions were held by Communists. In November he attended the WFTU Congress in Berlin, going on to Moscow. Upon his return in January 1952, he announced the dissolution of the PROG and advised its members to join Fortuny's PCG.

On January 25, 1952, the *Cominform* newspaper, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" published in Bucharest, Rumania, carried an article summarizing the findings of the Central Committee of the PCG on the shortcomings of *Octubre*. The publication of this article, in effect, confirmed the acceptance of Fortuny's PCG by the international Communist movement as the authorized Communist Party in Guatemala.

During 1952 the representatives of the PCG began to be reported in the press as sitting in on President Arbenz's political conferences with the representatives of the other leftist administration parties.

Early in the year there was a further upsurge in contacts with the international Communist movement. In March Blas Roca, Juan Marinello, and Salvador Aguirre, leaders of the Cuban Communist Party, visited Guatemala. In late May, Mario Silva Jonama, member of the PCG Political Committee, left for Moscow and the preliminary meeting of the Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conference in Peking, returning in early October. In September José Alberto Cardoza, who had followed Gutiérrez into the PCG, attended the main Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conference in Peking, coming and going through Moscow.

Meanwhile, the party had played a leading part in the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law of July 17, 1952, which was steered through Congress by the Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, whose chairman was Gutiérrez. The party leadership saw the agrarian reform as the vehicle to control the rural areas, and at this time a decision was taken to abandon restrictions on membership and to receive as many applicants as possible to create a "mass party."

In October the PCG announced that it would hold its Second Party Congress in December, and when this took place on December 11-14, a number of basic organizational decisions were taken: to change the party name to the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (the Guatemalan Labor Party—PGT) in order to sidestep the resistance to the word Communist and probably to ease the legalization of the party; to expand the party membership; to register the party in the Civil Registry; and to transform the weekly *Octubre* into a daily paper. The Congress also approved statutes for the PGT modeled on the standard organization of Stalinist Communist parties (see section II, A), and reelected Fortuny as Secretary General at the head of a Political Committee of 11 members and a Central Committee of 21 members.

On December 19 the PGT was registered as a political party in the Civil Registry despite the protest of anti-Communist groups that both the Constitution and the Electoral Law specifically forbid "political organizations of a foreign or international character." It presented a list of 532 members, 32 over the minimum required, to support its registration petition. The PGT then participated in the January 1953 congressional elections as a member of the administration's "Democratic Electoral Front." One of the PGT candidates, Pellecer, won in the Department of Escuintla and the other, Fortuny, lost in the Department of Guatemala, the opposition stronghold.

On February 17, 1953, the PGT reopened the "Jacobo Sánchez" school as a party cadre school. By August 15 the party had collected some \$10,000 from its basic organizations (cells) and launched a daily morning tabloid, *Tribuna Popular*. (\$10,000 is an inadequate sum to finance a daily newspaper in Guatemala, and many observers believe it is Government-subsidized.) In the PGT drive to increase party membership, the Party's first National Conference on Organization on August 8-9 claimed a 100 percent rise in the number of members since the December 1952 Party Congress.

The PGT had by then become an open and major organization in Guatemalan political life. During the remainder of 1953 and early 1954, the party grew in numbers and influence. In November it felt itself strong enough to present candidates independently of the other administration parties in six selected municipalities and elected four mayors, including that of the important Pacific slope center of Escuintla. Party membership grew, and although totals were not announced, the party press identified new cells in the countryside.

Meanwhile, pursuing the "popular front" tactic, the PGT had taken a lead in transforming the "Democratic Electoral Front" of the 1953 congressional elections into a permanent "National Democratic Front," whose council met with President Arbenz on policy questions and increasingly took over the Cabinet's policy-making functions. In

a speech on April 4, 1954, for instance, Carlos Manuel Pellecer revealed that Guatemalan tactics for the Caracas Conference had been decided upon at a meeting between Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello, the President, and the representatives of the Front. The Front came under effective Communist domination by the addition of the Communist-controlled CGTG and Communist-influenced CNCG to the political parties which originally composed it. At one meeting in 1954, four of the representatives were avowed PGT members, four were established as Communist sympathizers by trips to Moscow, participation in the "Peace" movement, etc., and two were political collaborators with the Communists.

Section II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

A. PARTY ORGANIZATION

1. *The Central Party Organization:* The *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* is organized along the centralized authoritarian lines on the model of the Soviet Communist Party under Stalin, and the party discipline deriving from this organizational form has been a unique asset in the Guatemalan political environment where other entities tend to be lax and haphazard. The party is now organized under statutes drawn up by the Political Committee, adopted with no known change at the Party Congress in December 1952, and entered on the Civil Registry the same month.¹ They do not incorporate the changes in terminology made by the Soviet Communist Party at its Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952 (e. g. the change of the name of the Political Bureau to the Presidium), but are substantively identical with the organization of Stalinist Communist Parties prior to the Nineteenth Congress.

The party is in effect ruled by its Political Committee, currently composed of 11 members, which in turn is dominated by the Secretariat, currently composed of 6 members. The Political Committee, which is elected by the Central Committee, "directs the Party's activities when the Central Committee is not in session." The Secretariat, which is elected by the Central Committee from among members of the Political Committee, "is responsible for the daily work of the Party leadership, for organizing the execution of the resolutions of the Central Committee and Political Committee, for the assignment and

¹ The October draft statutes are the only ones available for study and the subsequent material is based on them.

training of leaders." The Secretary General of the Central Committee by statute heads the Secretariat and presides over the Political Committee.

The Political Committee and the Secretariat form the heart of the party, for the more unwieldy Central Committee, which is supposed to meet in plenary session every 3 months, has never been recorded as doing anything but ratifying the work and reports of the party leaders. The Central Committee, currently composed of 21 members, is elected by the Party Congress, which is "the Party's highest authority" but is "normally called by the Central Committee every 3 years" and thus has little direct influence on daily party activity.

The Central Committee in addition to its Political Committee has standing Commissions on Organization, Propaganda, Education, Labor Unions, Women's, Peasants', Finance, and Youth Affairs. As will be seen, those concerned with activities outside of the party serve to organize the party's influence in "mass organizations."

The party Propaganda Commission publishes a daily, Tuesday through Sunday, tabloid-size newspaper, *Tribuna Popular*, and has announced a bimonthly magazine, *Octubre*. Since February 1953 the party has been conducting the "Jacobo Sánchez" evening school to train party cadres. The Organization Commission publishes a monthly *Boletín de Organización*.

2. *Regional and Local Organizations*: The subordinate party organizations in essence are abbreviated reproductions of the centralism of the national party headquarters. The statutes provide for departmental and municipal organizations, and regional, sectional and district organizations as the next or "intermediate" echelon of the party structure. An Assembly, which meets once a year or oftener, is again the "highest authority" of these organizations, and departmental, municipal, regional, etc., committees are elected. However, real power is vested in a Secretariat, which is elected by these committees from among their members and which "shall be the executive bodies of the respective organizations." The supremacy of the party's national leadership is specifically provided for by obligating the "intermediate" organizations to "make certain that the resolutions of higher Party organs are carried out."

The foundation of the party structure is the "Basic Committee," popularly referred to as the "cell," to which every member must belong. It elects its own secretaries and has the functions of carrying out the party's propaganda, to report to higher headquarters on the "sentiments and needs of the worker," to carry out organizational and recruiting works, and to enforce discipline.

Some 30 party basic organizations were identified by name in Communist publications in 1953-54. These cells were named "Octubre," "Juan Pablo Wainwright," "Pedro Molina," "Mao Tze Tung,"

(in the Department of Suchitepéquez), "Dmitri Shostakovich," "Estrella Roja," "Bandera Roja" (Guatemala), "Dolores Ibarriuri," "Maximiliano Gorki," "Georgi Dimitroff," "José Martí," "Francisco Morazón," "Mariano Galvez," "Tecún Umán," "Decreto 800," "José Manuel Fortuny," "Espartaco" (Jutiapa), "9 de Mayo," "5 de Mayo" (Retalhuleu), "1 de Mayo" (Alta Verapaz), "Enrique Muñoz Meany" (Chimaltenango), "Julius Fucik," "José Díaz," "Jesus Menendez," "Popul Vuh," "Kaibil Balan," "Luis Sánchez Batten," (Sololá), "Martires Rosenberg," "Francisco Barrundin," "Justo Rufino Barrios," and "Pavel Korchagin."

It has positively been stated at various times in the party press that the party has cells in the Departments of Guatemala, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Jutiapa, Santa Rosa, Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu, Sololá, Chimaltenango, Quezaltenango, Escuintla, Peten, Chiquimula, Zacapa and Izabal. These are 15 of Guatemala's 22 Departments. There are probably also organizations in other Departments.

3. *"Democratic Centralism," the Party's Discipline*: The statutes of the PGT specifically provide that the party structure is based on "democratic centralism," which they define in a key statement as "subordination of the minority to the majority; of the members to the decisions of the Base Committee; of lower organs to higher organs; and all organs and organizations to the Central Committee." Since, as outlined above, the Central Committee is effectively dominated by its Political Committee and eventually by the Secretariat and Secretary General, the term "democratic centralism" covers up in Guatemala as elsewhere an effective authoritarian rule of the party by its leading elements.

A rigid disciplinary system is provided in the statutes for individual members. They must pay dues regularly (a duty of symbolic as well as financial importance); respect and unconditionally carry out party decisions after they are taken; and defend the party unity and combat any divisionist activity. If party members hold electoral offices they must hand over their entire salary to the party and "The Party, taking into consideration their previous salaries, will pay for their new necessities and the representation expenses connected with their positions which will allow them to live decently within the Party's means." Party cards are renewed annually, at which time dues must be paid up to date; the last exchange took place in December 1953-January 1954.

B. THE PARTY LEADERSHIP

1. *The Apparent Supremacy of Fortuny*: The PGT leadership in 1954, composed totally of *ladinos*, represents a welding together of Fortuny's "political group" and Gutiérrez's "labor-PROG" group, and despite the doubts of some that Fortuny is the leading Communist,

an analysis of the available evidence indicates that he is in a position effectively to exercise control of the party machinery.

Fortuny himself, at the December 1952 Congress, held onto the key position of Secretary General and, as such, is the presiding officer of the Central Committee, of the Political Committee, and of the Secretariat. Moreover, the other four Secretaries of the Central Committee—Alvarado Monzón, Guerra Borges, Silva Jonama, and Ramos—are ex-members of Fortuny's *Octubre* group. They in turn control key commissions of the Central Committee. Alvarado Monzón is head of the Organization Commission, which supervises the party machinery; Guerra Borges is temporarily in charge of the Propaganda Commission and is editor of the party newspaper; Ramos is chief of the Peasants' Commission, which plays an important role in agrarian reform policy, and Silva Jonama presides over the Education Commission, which has charge of party indoctrination.

By contrast Gutiérrez and the group which is now active in the CGTG has a secondary place in the formal party hierarchy. None of them are Secretaries. Gutiérrez, Cardoza, and Virgilio Guerra, leaders of the old labor group are members of the Political Committee, and the first is head of the Labor Union Commission. Pellecer, who was associated with the *Octubre* group but whose principal activity is in the CGTG, is also a member of the Political Committee. While the labor group thus has important positions in the PGT leadership, it does not have the controlling positions that the Fortuny group has.

In the background there is reinforcing evidence of Fortuny's leading role in the party. By a choice which became evident after Gutiérrez's return from Moscow in January 1952, it was Fortuny's *Octubre* group rather than Gutiérrez's PROG group which emerged as the chosen instrument of international communism in Guatemala. While this appeared more the settling of a friendly rivalry than a victory in a bitter factional battle, it is evident that Gutiérrez and his group assumed for the moment a secondary role in intraparty affairs, although this is often obscured by the fact that because of their role in labor affairs and in Congress Gutiérrez and those associated with him receive more newspaper space than their superior officers in the formal party structure.

The case made to deny Fortuny's preeminence is centered on his alleged lack of intellectual attainments, his reported laziness, and his reported lack of character. These arguments, however, are short of conclusive, for they neglect the cardinal fact that Fortuny has had more experience and successes in Guatemalan political life than any other Communist leader: He was a 1944 founder of the FPL, twice Secretary General of the PAR; leader of the *Vanguardia Democrática* from its founding in 1947, and of the *Partido Comunista de Guatemala*

from 1949 onward; and the winner in the settlement as to whether his PCG or Gutiérrez's PROG should be the chosen international Communist movement instrument in Guatemala. In the history of the Guatemalan Communist Party, as in the history of all Communist Parties since Stalin undermined Lenin's policies and overcame Trotsky, it appears risky to presuppose that the most intelligent and the most doctrinaire Communist must be the party leader.

2. *Contacts with Moscow:* Although none of the members of the PGT Political Committee are known to have visited Moscow before the 1944 revolution, there has since been a continual flow of PGT leaders to the Soviet capital. At least 6 of the 11 have been there since the war. Pellecer was Secretary of Legation there in 1945 and went to Eastern Europe in 1949. Fortuny toured the "Peoples Democracies" in 1949 after attending the Paris Partisans of Peace Congress and quite possibly took in the U. S. S. R. on his tour. He was on a trip to Moscow from November 5, 1953, to January 12, 1954. Gutiérrez went to Moscow in December 1951 and again in November 1953; Silva Jonama and José Alberto Cardoza went through the U. S. S. R. on their way back and forth to the June and September Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conferences in 1952. José Luis Ramos was there in 1953. Virgilio Guerra was scheduled to leave for Moscow in May 1954. In addition, Oscar Edmundo Palma, a member of the Central Committee, went to the Soviet Union after the April 1953 meeting of the World Peace Congress in Budapest, and a number of Guatemalan youth and "peace" delegations visited the U. S. S. R., China, and the "Peoples Democracies" in 1952 and 1953.

Apart from these trips the PGT leadership is in contact with the main current of international communism through participation in a variety of international conferences and congresses sponsored by the WFTU, the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Students Union, etc. Fortuny, Gutiérrez, Silva Jonama, and Cardoza, as mentioned above, attended "Peace" meetings, while Gutiérrez attended the WFTU Congresses in Milan (1949), Berlin (1951), and is now a delegate to the Vienna (WFTU) Congress. In addition to this attendance, there is a constant exchange of communications between the Vienna headquarters of the WFTU and Gutiérrez as CGTG Secretary General, some of which are published in the press as WFTU messages of "solidarity" with various Guatemalan strikes. Similar communications pass between Soviet international organizations, such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and their Guatemalan affiliates.

There are also, as described above, the frequent visits of Latin American Communist leaders, such as Dionisio Encina, Secretary General of the Mexican Communist Party, who attended the December 1952 PGT Party Congress.

Supplementing these personal contacts, the PGT leadership receives a flow of literature from Moscow as well as the headquarters of various Soviet-controlled international organizations. To judge by the contents of the former party weekly *Octubre* and the present daily *Tribuna Popular*, these include the Spanish-language edition of the *Cominform Journal* "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" published in Bucharest, and a limited file of the Soviet TASS news agency.

From these various sources, the PGT leadership is in constant contact with the twistings and turnings of Soviet tactics and is able to adjust its own policies accordingly. Though there are doubtless additional surreptitious channels of communications and Soviet control, as has proved the case in Communist parties elsewhere, these publicly recorded contacts appear sufficient to give the PGT adequate orientation.

C. PARTY MEMBERSHIP

1. *Estimates Vary from 3,000-4,000:* The PGT, a Communist party which here as elsewhere gives every evidence of valuing key positions over weight of members, has never publicly revealed the number of its members and any estimate above 3,000 must at this stage be regarded as guesswork.

The public evidence on party membership¹ starts with the fact that the PGT in December 1952, submitted the names, addresses, and identification card numbers of 532 members to the Civil Registrar to meet a requirement of the Electoral Law that this information be given on 500 or more members before a political party can be registered. Later, at a party organizational conference in August 1953, the claim was publicly made that the party's membership had increased "over 100 percent" since the previous December, a statement which, if taken at face value, would have made the party membership at least 1,070 in mid-1953.

However, there is circumstantial evidence that the party membership was greater than 532 when the names were handed in to the Civil Registrar in December 1952. The names of several national Communist figures, such as Victor Manuel Gutiérrez of the PGT Political Committee, were not included, possibly because it was not convenient to obtain the needed data from them, and in the months following the publication of this roster a score of other party members have been identified in the press. More importantly, logic dictates

¹ In assessing Communist strength in Guatemala it is necessary to discriminate between the category "PGT members" and the wider category of "Communists." As indicated above, all Communists in Guatemala are not necessarily members of the PGT and this subsection is addressed only to PGT members.

that the Communist leadership when required to produce only 500 names would not have needlessly exposed many more members to possible future action against them. Moreover, any secret members camouflaging under the labels of other parties or organizations would scarcely be exposed.

Thus, if party membership was greater than 532 in December 1952 and the claim that it has since doubled is correct, the PGT would have counted more than 1,100 members at the August 1953 Organization Conference. A party member was reported in the summer of 1953 to have asserted that party membership stood at 3,000, but it seems unlikely that even within the party more than a few persons have access to the party rolls. Nonetheless, it would appear a fair guess that the party numbered at least 2,000 in mid-1953 and every indication, such as the November 1953 municipal elections, has been that the party has continued to multiply rapidly. A reasonable estimate of its strength in May 1954 would appear to be 3,000-4,000.

There is little doubt that the PGT is now in a stage of expanding membership and is tactically emphasizing a "mass" party rather than a select party. At the last party congress in December 1952, the need to recruit members was stressed and the party name was changed from the *Comunista de Guatemala* (PCG) to the PGT (Guatemalan Labor Party) in part because the word "Communist" in the party title was acknowledged to be a hindrance to its acceptance by the masses. This confirmed the decision taken at the time of the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law that June to expand the party and seemed a clear indication that the party was willing to accept less than fully indoctrinated militants as members at this stage. The apparently successful recruiting drive doubling the party's size in 7 months tends to support this impression. The party has benefited in recruiting not only from its change of name but by its registration as a legal party in December 1952 and by the many evidences that it enjoys the favor of the Arbenz administration.

As to the composition of the party membership, the National Conference on Organization in August 1953 stated that 50 percent were urban and rural workers, 29 percent farmers and tenants, and 21 percent middle class.

D. THE VEILED COMMUNISTS

1. *The Non-Party Communists:* In addition to the leadership and membership of the PGT, the party enjoys significant support from persons who are ideologically Communists but not openly PGT members, and from what is possibly an underground Communist group. This subject is naturally shrouded in secrecy and the publicly available information is limited, but any assessment of the overt party organization must recognize that it is only at the moment the instrument

of international communism and that, in any shifting developments of the future, a sizable group of persons dedicated to Moscow's principles are available to carry forward the cause.

Among those who are most probably nonparty Communists in important positions are Alfonso Solórzano and Abel Cuenca. The former was a member of the recognized Communist Party in Mexico and the latter was a Communist in El Salvador as far back as 1932, but there is no evidence that they have joined Fortuny's PGT. Solórzano, according to a wide variety of political observers, was expelled from the Mexican Communist Party, which he had joined during his pre-1944 exile and association with Lombardo Toledano, but he considers himself ideologically a better Communist than the ruling members of the PGT, who in many cases were his pupils. Cuenca, likewise, is generally reported to be out of sympathy with Fortuny's group. Another of the same character is Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, who is sometimes said, but with less consistency, to have been a Communist Party member in Chile and is now closely associated with Solórzano.

The differences between these personalities and the leadership of Fortuny's PGT appear to be of an organizational and tactical order, for none of them are ever recorded to have entered into conflict with the thesis that Soviet-type communism is inevitable and desirable and should be promoted in Guatemala. In June 1952 Solórzano, Cuenca, and Alvarado Fuentes, then Secretary General of the *Partido Acción Revolucionaria* (PAR), were principals in the establishment of the *Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca* (PRG) as the "single revolutionary party" and thus, in essence, showed themselves as favoring the continued use of the administration parties as the principal vehicle for furthering Communist objectives. Fortuny by that time was committed to the use of an organized Communist Party as the principal vehicle, and his party, then the PCG, had the previous January received the endorsement of the *Cominform Journal*. On July 3, 1952, he launched an attack in *Octubre* on the PRG and "workers' leaders" (unnamed but undoubtedly Solórzano, Cuenca, and Alvarado Fuentes) who had participated in founding the PRG and who he charged were "deviationists." Shortly thereafter, in a labor dispute in Solórzano's Institute of Guatemalan Social Security (IGSS), Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the PGT Communist who was advising the workers, in a radio address labeled Solórzano "another Ana Pauker," referring to the Rumanian Communist leader who had shortly before been sensationally purged. Pellecer renewed his attack on Solórzano in April 1954.

The fact that the Solórzano-Cuenca-Alvarado Fuentes group and others are "deviationists" from the tactical viewpoint of Fortuny's PGT does not necessarily imply that they are out of step with the long-range purposes of the Moscow Communist movement. Overlooking

the possibility that they are subject to separate instructions, the facts are that before and since the 1952 flareup over the PRG both groups have pulled together in the traces to achieve Communist objectives in the fields of local labor and political organizations, the publicizing of the "Peace" campaign and other Soviet propaganda objectives, and the orientation of the administration's social security, agrarian reform, and other programs along Communist lines.

2. *The Intellectual Pro-Communists:* Another group reinforcing the PGT is composed of young intellectuals who are active in politics and follow the Communist line undeviatingly although they are publicly, and quite possibly privately, not members of Fortuny's PGT. In many cases they were members of the university and schoolteachers, groups from which the Communist leadership is drawn; and in some cases they say, with conviction if possible self-deception, that they are "not Communists" although they meet every qualification except PGT membership. They are, in short, a group which was subjected to the same influences as the intellectuals who formed the PGT, but they may have stopped short of party membership.

Among the typical members of this group is Julio Estrada de la Hoz, president of Congress in 1952-53, once a leading member of Alvarado Fuentes' faction in the PAR. As a leader of the PAR and one-time editor of the *Diario de la Mañana*, he has consistently followed the Communist line, although a lifelong friend and political associate has stated he is "not a Communist." Another of the former university group is Jaime Díaz Rozzotto, Secretary General of President Arbenz' Executive Office and Secretary General of *Renovación Nacional*, a leftist administration party. He professes not to be a Communist, although he was the first Secretary General of the Guatemalan "Peace" movement in 1949 and has since engaged in every major Communist-sponsored cause to the extent of welcoming the 1953 truce in Korea as another step toward the establishment of a "Socialist World."

Among schoolteachers, the intellectual Communist group counts Oscar Jimenez de León, a leader of the pro-Communist wing of the RN; Héctor Fion Garma, an RN deputy who was active with Gutiérrez in the STEG teachers' union; and Alfonso Orantes, ex-president of the National Electoral Board, a member of the PRG Political Committee, and president of the Communist-front *Casade Cultura*.

Without the discipline inherent in PGT membership, the political orientation of this type of intellectual and his ardor for the Communist cause is constantly shifting. Some, such as Díaz Rozzotto, appear more openly identified with communism as time evolves. On the other hand, in the past 2 years two have clashed with the PGT leadership: Amor Américo Velasco de León was expelled from his

key position as Secretary of Organization of the *Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala* (CNCG) in September 1952 for attempting to counter PGT efforts to dominate that agricultural federation, and Alvaro Hugo Salguero was removed from the leadership of the PAR and later publicly accused the PGT of undermining him. Both had previously acted in harmony with Communist objectives.

3. *A Possible Crypto-Communist Group*: The effective ranks of the PGT are possibly further reinforced by crypto-Communists, some of whom are masquerading in ostensibly non-Communist organizations and some of whom may have been placed in the shadows where they would not be exposed directly in the always-present possibility of an anti-Communist coup in this country. The names of only approximately 600 of the PGT's estimated 3,000-4,000 membership have been made public.

There is no public evidence of the existence of such a crypto-Communist group, but circumstances give grounds for suspicion. First, the PGT itself was by Fortuny's statement a secret group from 1947 to 1951 when it acted within the PAR and other political and labor organizations, and nothing in its subsequent action indicates abandonment of this tactic. Second, it is logical to suppose that a person holding a good position in the administration parties or the Government would be advised to keep his membership in the PGT secret if publicly acknowledged membership would be a handicap to the use of his position for the PGT's purposes. Third, a number of persons who were active in the *Escuela Claridad* and early Communist activities have vanished from the limelight. While a proportion may be accounted for by the announced purge of 1949 and other purges, some may well be kept in the background in intraparty activities to provide a nucleus of underground leadership in the event the party's position in Guatemala changes.

The nonparty Communist of the Solórzano type, the Communist-oriented intellectual of the Estrada de la Hoz variety, and the possible member of a crypto-Communist group thus must be taken into account in evaluating the manpower available to the Communists, for doubtless any one of them is more valuable to the PGT in achieving its objectives than the larger numbers of farm workers blanketed into the party in the current membership expansion drive.

E. THE AIMS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. *Subordination to Soviet Aims*: The primary but seldom publicly professed aim of the PGT is to act in the role of the vanguard in Guatemala of the "inevitable" triumph of world communism led by the Soviet Union. While neither the party statutes nor the public statements of PGT leaders acknowledge a direct organizational sub-

ordination to the Soviet party-state, numerous party actions and statements testify to the ideological subordination of the PGT to the Soviet Union. For instance, in a message of October 2, 1952, to the Soviet Nineteenth Party Congress, the Guatemalan Communist Party stated, "Our Party salutes the indestructible unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is a guarantee of the successful construction of a Communist society in your homeland, a beacon throughout the world for workers. Inspired by your example, we will intensify our struggle for the national independence and happiness of our people."

More indirectly, the PGT daily acknowledges the Soviet Union's ideological leadership by adjusting its own party line with great sensitivity to the twistings and turnings of the Soviet line. Thus, in a few months early in 1953 the PGT's *Octubre* and other propaganda outlets blandly endorsed the accusations of Stalin's Government that "Jewish doctors" had plotted the death of certain Soviet leaders, reversed themselves after Stalin's death in March by endorsing the new line put out by Beria, Minister of the Interior and of State Security, that the doctors' confessions had been extracted by "impermissible means," and finally reversed themselves again by joining in Malenkov's accusations that Beria was a traitor. Such examples are repeated with each turn of the Soviet line.

The fact that the ultimate aims of the Guatemalan PGT are subordinated to the long-range Soviet aim of a Communist world has a direct effect on its immediate aims and tactics. The Guatemalan PGT acts within a global not a local Guatemalan political context. It thus conceives of the ultimate triumph of communism in Guatemala as part of a successful worldwide advance of the Communist forces and, as a disciplined battalion in the advance of an army, refrains from charging ahead blindly and adjusts its tactics and objectives to support the main effort, so the PGT subordinates its local effort to seize control of the Guatemalan Government to the wider consideration of assisting in the reduction of the stronghold of free nations grouped around the United States.

All of this is obscured and glossed over in the catch phrases of the Communist lexicon, but reflection bares the essential purposes of the PGT. On the international plane, the party has consistently put the "Peace" campaign as the central and orienting point of its activities, and the "Peace campaign" is defined as "struggling against the imperialist warmongers" and "preventing the chaining of small nations and their resources to the imperialist war chariot." This is to say that the central point of the Communist program is to fight against the United States and to prevent small nations, like Guatemala, from collaborating effectively in the United States-led struggle against Soviet Communist advances. The PGT thus adopts as its primary

orientation that the defeat or isolation of the United States is the first prerequisite of triumph of communism in Guatemala as elsewhere.

(Newspapermen and other observers of the Guatemalan scene have often given evidence of examining the "Communist" problem on a local rather than international plane. Their eyes frequently seem directed principally at the degree that the Guatemalan Communists exercise control of the Government and overlook the wider implications that this control is not necessarily the objective of communism at this phase but an instrument to serve the broader purposes of Communist advance.)

2. *The Domestic Program*: Within the framework of advancing international communism, the PGT has adopted a program in Guatemalan domestic affairs evidently calculated to disrupt the social and political structure and sever the links between Guatemala and the United States.

The party program, adopted at the 1952 Congress, is entitled *El Camino Guatemalteco*, the "Guatemalan Way." It is in its currently applicable portions summarized in a report by Fortuny, approved by the Central Committee at its plenary session May 16-17, 1953, consisting of seven points. These, in the stated order of importance are:

1. The application of agrarian reform must be carried on.
2. Intensify the fight against foreign monopolies and increase the anti-imperialist sentiment of our people, especially the United Fruit Company, the International Railways of Central America, and the *Empresa Electrica* power and light company.
3. Denounce with greater insistence the counter revolutionary activities of feudal imperialist reaction.
4. Give increasing support to progressive measures undertaken by the democratic Government of President Arbenz, such as the highway to the Atlantic which will allow Guatemala, by competing with the U.S.-owned IRCA Railroad, to free itself from monopolistic exploitation.
5. Improve the living conditions of the masses, especially by struggling for a minimum daily rural wage of 80 cents and urban wage of \$1.25.
6. Cultivate and strengthen organic unity and united action in the working class, by fighting against diversionism in labor organization.
7. Tighten the alliance between the workers and peasants.

In its totality this program can be seen as a shrewd adaptation of current Guatemalan conditions to the requirement of the long-range objective of Communist world domination and the intermediate aim of separating Guatemala from the Western powers. The PGT's party literature and the speeches of its leaders continually emphasize that conditions are not ripe for the establishment of the "dictator-

ship of the proletariat," that is, the seizure of power by the Communists: Guatemala must first liquidate its "feudal" agricultural social system and pass through "bourgeois revolution" and "capitalist" phases before this evolution can take place. In party doctrine, the function of the agrarian reform is to accelerate these social changes and thus pave the way for the long-run triumph of communism. But, in the short run, the agrarian reform serves as a punitive weapon against all the propertied elements, whose interests and traditions have historically been an important factor serving to cement Guatemala into the Western World. More directly, the PGT seeks to break down the Guatemalan-Western relationship by concentration on the fight against the economic interests of the United States in Guatemala ("foreign monopolies") and on support to the construction of competing Guatemalan "national" enterprises.

Nonetheless, while the party is not prepared to initiate the repressive aspects of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," it is clear that the party is achieving effective control of the Guatemalan political organizations as a means of carrying out its program. If it is completely successful in this, it will be the first time that a Communist-controlled state is established outside the Soviet sphere.

Section III

THE LEVERS OF POWER

A. THE PRINCIPLES OF INDIRECT CONTROL AND THE NATIONAL FRONT

With its Political Committee as the nerve center, the PGT exerts dominant influence on the key policies of the present Guatemalan Government through a system of indirect control of, or influence on, determining units of the national political organism. The system employed may be likened to the works of a watch, with the PGT Political Committee as the mainspring, the "mass" organizations as the first gears, and the administration parties and some Government agencies as the secondary gears, the whole so meshed together that an impulse from the center is smoothly transmitted to distant entities which have no apparent connection with the party. Thus, for example, the Political Committee (the mainspring) might evolve a new aspect to its agrarian reform policy; this impulse would first be transmitted to the Communist leadership of the National Labor Federation, CGTG (the first gear); and it would finally go forward to those local and departmental Agrarian Committees (the secondary gears) which are under CGTG domination. Simultaneously the impulse would go from the Political Committee to PGT members in key

positions on the policymaking "National Democratic Front" and in the National Agrarian Department and thence to the whole of the Department's machinery. This system of intermeshing gears has the advantage of providing a machinery with which the numerically small Communist leadership can effectively manipulate various organizations, many of whose members are not conscious of being used for Communist purposes.

The PGT has built up this machinery by a complex campaign of maintaining close relationship with the administration; working harder than any other Guatemalan entity; infiltrating key Government agencies; establishing an interlocking directorate between the PGT Central Committee and the nation's labor, women's, youth, and students' organizations; and achieving a position of preeminence in the "National Democratic Front" of administration parties while shrewdly working against the consolidation of a non-Communist "revolutionary" movement.

B. PENETRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. *The Favor of the Arbenz Administration:* The good will and cooperation of President Arbenz and his administration has been the PGT's main asset and remains so, although the PGT's growth in size and power is in great part plainly aimed at making it independent of the existence of a sympathetic Chief Executive. (E.g. now that the PGT controls the CGTG, it stands for less government "interference" in union affairs.) President Arbenz' propensity for Communists is an undisguised fact. The Communist Party came into the open as the PCG at the beginning of his administration and was entered in the Civil Registry without regard to the Guatemalan constitutional injunction against "political organizations of a foreign or international character." He brought the Communist leaders into the political meetings of administration parties which he holds in his office, and these parties, which he controls, openly supported Communist candidates in the January 1953 congressional elections (Fortuny in the Department of Guatemala and Pellecer in the Department of Escuintla). Fortuny is a leading member of his "kitchen cabinet" and professed Communists are employed in important positions in the public administration. In his March 1953 Annual Message to Congress he served public notice that he would not suppress communism and in effect reemphasized this the following month when his Government withdrew from the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) in order to sidestep El Salvador's proposal that means to control communism be discussed at its next meeting. In public ceremonies and on May 1 Labor Day demonstration in 1953, he has publicly thrown his arms around Communist leaders in the Latin Amer-

ican fashion, thereby identifying himself with them in the popular mind.

In his March 1954 Annual Message to Congress Arbenz referred to the Communists as "democratic" and "progressive" and said that to isolate them would be equivalent to the suicide of the revolutionary movement.

Finally, it is generally known that political parties in Guatemala, and particularly political newspapers such as the PGT's *Tribuna Popular*, cannot be successful without direct or indirect support of the public treasury, and this could not be given in appreciable measure without the approval of the Chief Executive.

The President's public speeches and actions indicate him as a leftist influenced by Marxist thought and an extreme nationalist, but he has not defined his personal ideological orientation towards communism. He has not publicly acknowledged aid to the PGT, and his official position might be defined as one of denying that his Government is Communist while simultaneously defending the freedom of Communists to organize and engage in politics as any other citizens. He thus, publicly at least, implicitly accepts the Communists as an authentic domestic political party and not as part of the worldwide Soviet Communist conspiracy.

2. *Penetration of Government Agencies:* Shielded by the favor of the Chief Executive, the Communists have infiltrated their members and supported their sympathizers in key positions in the public administration, with special concentration on the agrarian reform machinery, the Government information and propaganda agencies, the wealthy social security system, and public education institutions.

The Cabinet of President Arbenz, as his administration from time to time points out in refutation of charges that it is "Communist," does not and has never contained a known member of the Communist Party. However, this statement is somewhat deceptive, for the Guatemalan Cabinet is more of an executive than a policy-forming body. In policy matters, the President consults regularly with the "National Democratic Front" of administration parties and labor organizations, on which PGT members hold 4 seats, and on which there are at least 4 Communist sympathizers of record of the 10 members who attended meetings in early 1954. This "National Democratic Front" has rapidly replaced the Cabinet as a focal point of policy formulation.

The President also maintains contact with a number of personal advisers, a sort of "kitchen cabinet," in which Fortuny is probably the most prominent individual. Thus, for instance, when the Agrarian Reform Bill was submitted to the Cabinet prior to transmission to Congress in May 1952, it had already been drawn up by the President

and his advisers, and the Cabinet merely played the role of a consultative body.

Below the level of the Cabinet the area of heaviest Communist infiltration is perhaps the governmental machinery established to carry out the agrarian reform, which the PGT sets as its first task in domestic affairs. Despite the fact that only a small fraction of the names of the PGT members have been made public, a significant number of the employees of the National Agrarian Department (*Departamento Agrario Nacional*) appear among them. The Department is headed by Maj. Alfonso Martínez Estévez, an opportunist non-Communist who was President Arbenz' private secretary until July 1, 1952; but Waldemar Barrios Klée, the head of the Lands Section, who acts as Chief when Major Martínez is absent, is a PGT member. The Secretary General of this Department, through whom all papers are funneled, is Sra. María Jérez de Fortuny, the latest of Sr. Fortuny's 3 wives. Of a score of inspectors of the National Agrarian Department, 7 are publicly registered PGT members and at least 7 others have been identified as Communists. In addition, another dozen of the 350-odd National Agrarian Department employees are known members of PGT. A Guatemalan newspaper, the independent *El Espectador* of September 9, 1953, made the charge that "85 percent" of all departmental employees adhered to the PGT, a statement which is possibly an exaggeration but indicative of the Communist coloration that the Department has quickly taken on since its establishment in July 1952.

The leverage of the PGT over the agrarian reform is further enhanced by the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952, as amended. In addition to the National Agrarian Department, the law establishes local Agrarian Committees, which pass in the first instance on petitions for the expropriation and distribution of land; departmental Agrarian Commissions, which are the first reviewing authority; and a National Agrarian Council, which is the final court of appeal under the President. The law, as amended, provided that 60 percent of the personnel on local Agrarian Committees should be composed of representatives of the CGTG or CNCG; that 1 of the 3 members of the departmental Agrarian Committee should represent the CGTG and another the CNCG; and that 1 of the 9 members of the National Agrarian Council¹ should represent the CGTG and 2 others the CNCG. As the CGTG is controlled by the PGT (its representative on the National Agrarian Council is José Luis Ramos, the Secretary of the PGT in charge of the party's Peasant Commission) and the CNCG is under Communist influence, the PGT

¹ The General Association of Agriculturists (AGA), a landowners' organization, has not appointed the representative to which it is legally entitled. There are thus in reality only eight members of the Council.

Political Committee has considerable means of directing the course of and pace of the agrarian reform.

Despite the paucity of public documentation on PGT members, avowed Communists are perceptible in a number of Government posts outside of the agrarian reform machinery. Thus, for instance, Edelberto Torres, Sr., the Nicaraguan Communist, is Chief of the publications house of the Ministry of Public Education, and communism is so influential among the teachers that Rafael Tischler, a registered PGT member who visited the Soviet Union in 1953, is Secretary General of the national teachers' union, the STEG. In the Ministry of Communications, Carlos Alvarado Jérez is Chief of the *Dirección General de Radiodifusión* and director of the national radio station TGW. Under the Ministry of Economy and Labor, Hugo Barrios Klée, a PGT member and brother of Waldemar Barrios Klée of the National Agrarian Department, is Deputy Inspector General of Labor, and Humberto Pineda, Labor Inspector in Cuiulapa, Department of Santa Rosa, has also been identified as a PGT member.

Persons whose PGT membership has not been publicly avowed but who are fully Communist in their unstinting public praise of party ideals and the Soviet Union also occupy influential Government positions. Raúl Leiva, a writer and poet who has been a leading Communist propagandist, is Chief of the Press Section of the President's Information Office (*Secretaría de Publicidad y Propaganda*) and heads the Office when his Chief is absent. Otto Raúl González, a leading young Guatemalan poet, eulogist of conditions in Eastern Europe and participant in Communist causes, is now the representative of the Directorate General of Statistics on the National Agrarian Council, and has been a member of both the President's and the National Agrarian Department's Information Offices.

The Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS) appears to be a stronghold of the "nonparty" Communists who support the PGT program but are not always organizationally at peace with Fortuny's dominant clique in the PGT. The Manager of the IGSS is Solórzano, whose continuing Communist ideology, reported expulsion from the Mexican Communist Party, and role in the crystallization of communism in Guatemala, are described above. The personnel includes a number of Communist personalities, such as Sra. Laura Mallol de Bermudez, a Chilean, who formerly taught in the IGSS School of Social Service and is now in the maternity service.

3. *The PGT Position in Congress:* In the legislative branch of the Guatemalan Government, the PGT has only 4 of the 56 deputies in the unicameral Congress, but these are in key positions. The 4 are Gutiérrez and José Alberto Córdova, both representing the Department of Guatemala, César Montenegro Paniagua, representing the Department of Suchitepéquez, and Carlos Manuel Pellecer,

representing the Department of Escuintla. Gutiérrez is First Secretary of Congress (1954-55) and Chairman of Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform (1952-54). José Alberto Cardoza has been chairman of the Special Committee on Revision of the Labor Code (1952-54). Moreover, Pellecer during the 1953-54 sessions was perhaps the most vociferous administration supporter and organizer on the floor.

C. MANIPULATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION POLITICAL PARTIES

1. *The "National Democratic Front"*: In the field of organized party politics, the Political Committee of the PGT exerts its indirect influence through the *Frente Democrático Nacional* (the "National Democratic Front"), which is an alliance of the parties and labor groups supporting the Arbenz administration: The *Partido Acción Revolucionaria* (PAR), the *Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca* (PRG), the *Partido Renovación Nacional* (RN), the Communist *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT) itself, and the CGTG and CNCG. The Front holds 51 of the 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress, and virtually all Government jobs are filled with members of one or other of the parties.

The PGT effectively controls the personnel of the Front's managing body, which meets with President Arbenz. In a typical meeting with the President in early 1954, the representatives were: for the PGT, Fortuny and Guerra Borges; for the CGTG, Gutiérrez and Max Salazar, both PGT members; for the CNCG, Leonardo Castillo Flores, 1953 visitor to Moscow and Oscar Bautista; for the PAR, Julio Estrada de la Hoz, Communist-line intellectual and Marco Antonio Franco, a 1953 visitor to the Soviet orbit; and for the PRG, Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, longtime political collaborator with the Communists, and Alfonso Solórzano, the "nonparty" Communist manager of the IGSS. (The two RN seats at this period were vacant due to a party split.)

In the field of ideology and party programs also, the PGT has established its ascendancy in the Front. The other parties, although labeling themselves "revolutionary," have found themselves since the 1944 revolution handicapped by the fact that they produced no authentic native Guatemalan revolutionary ideology and had embarked on a period of social revolution without any navigational aids. In their early stage of development (section I) their deficiency in this sphere was supplied first by returning Communist personalities, such as Solórzano and Alvarado Fuentes, and later by crypto-Communists, such as Fortuny when he was Secretary General of the PAR. These advisers operated at that time within the administration parties, but with the exodus of the Communist groups of Gutiérrez and Fortuny in

1949 and 1950 these parties became increasingly reliant for ideological guidance on the Communist movement on the outside. At first the older administration parties tried to form alliances omitting the new Communist groups, but they failed to develop a non-Communist revolutionary ideology as cement, and the alliances one by one fell of their internal dissensions. In October 1952 the Communist Party formally entered the "Democratic Electoral Front" for the congressional elections of January 1953, and since then the party programs of the PAR, PRG, and RN have increasingly become replicas of the current line of the PGT Political Committee. They not only embody the Communist concepts of such programs as the agrarian reform, but are sprinkled with such terminology as the "struggle for peace," "foreign imperialists," "monopolist exploiters," etc.

The ascendancy of Communist ideology in the "National Democratic Front" is attributable not only to the void left by the failure of a non-Communist ideology to evolve, but also to an active factor, the infiltration into the PAR, PRG, and RN leadership of Communist sympathizers, some of whom may be secret members of the PGT.

The PAR is currently headed by Julio Estrada de la Hoz as Secretary General. His Communist orientation has repeatedly been shown by such acts as his signing, in June 1952, a message of solidarity with the North Korean Government charging that bacteriological warfare had been used in Korea.

The PRG is headed by Augusto Charnaud MacDonald as Secretary General. Currently the Minister of the Interior, he is a shrewd non-Communist politician who has, nonetheless, collaborated closely with the Communists. On his Political Committee he has Solórzano, Abel Cuenca, and Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, all of whom are closely identified with promoting Communist objectives.

The RN is currently split, but its dominant figure over the past 3 years has been Jaime Díaz Rozzotto as Secretary General. He is also Secretary General of President Arbenz' Executive Office (*Secretario General de la Presidencia*). He was quoted in the Guatemalan press as stating on July 31, 1953, at a rally that the Korean Armistice "represented another step toward the achievement of a Socialist world," but he maintains, without definition of what he means, that he is "not a Communist."

2. *The "Divide and Rule" Tactic*: While the PGT thus exercises considerable influence over the "National Democratic Front" parties through ideology and sympathetic leaders, its party literature and its record give a strong indication that Fortuny and his colleagues are conscious that the rank and file of the PAR, the PRG, and the RN are not Communists and that the creation of a single non-Communist administration party might result in a "petty bourgeois" party which

the PGT could not control. They have therefore tried to keep the other forces of the "National Democratic Front" divided so that their support would be necessary to any faction within it. From 1944 until 1952 the issue of communism itself was an important factor in keeping the parties divided as each party had a "pro-Communist" and a "non-Communist" wing. The struggle of these two wings dominated the internal affairs of the PAR and the RN, with the most pro-Communist faction gradually winning in both. In 1951, as part of this series of factional fights, Charnaud MacDonald withdrew from the PAR in protest against the reelection of Alvarado Fuentes as Secretary General and founded the Socialist Party.

A new form of organizational conflict arose on June 10, 1952, when Charnaud MacDonald, as Secretary General of the Socialist Party, and Alvarado Fuentes, Secretary General of the PAR, announced the fusion of their parties into the PRG, which was to be the "single" revolutionary party. They invited the RN, the *Frente Popular Liberador* (FPL) and the *Partido Integridad Nacional* (PIN), but not the Communist PCG of the era, to join them, and all did so in short order. Fortuny apparently quickly saw that the PRG as the "single," non-Communist administration party might overshadow his PCG, and on July 3 he launched an attack on it in the PCG newspaper *Octubre*, charging that the party represented the small bourgeoisie and that the "workers' leaders" (i.e. Alvarado Fuentes and Solórzano and Cuenca who had joined him) were guilty of "rightist deviation." This attack, coupled with strong personal conflicts within the PRG, resulted in the withdrawal of the PAR and the RN later in July 1952.

Following the destruction of the PRG as the "single" administration party, the PAR was in the ascendancy in the latter half of 1952 and the early months of 1953. It was the principal victor in the January 1953 congressional elections and had come into close alignment with the CNCG, the numerically strong agricultural workers' and small farmers' federation, which with Communist aid had been weaned from Charnaud MacDonald and the PRG. With the PAR thus threatening to become a dominant and unmanageable "non-Communist" administration party, Fortuny and the PGT leadership began to give signs that they were seeking to undermine the PAR. The party was rocked by continual scandals in 1953, and by the spring of 1954 it had all but lost its opportunity to stand independently of the Communists.

The PGT policy thus gives every evidence of being intended to divide and rule the "National Democratic Front." It is, in short, a part of the PGT's struggle to increase its influence at the expense of its allies, but this struggle in practical politics has yet given no signs of transforming itself into an ideological conflict between Communists and non-Communists.

D. CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT

1. *The Significance of Organized Workers in Guatemala:* The organized labor movement in Guatemala in 1954 has become the Communist PGT's most important single instrument for shaping political developments of the country. The importance of organized labor in industry, commerce, and agriculture is reflected in the fact that the Administrative Department of Labor of the Guatemalan Ministry of Economy and Labor reported in April 1953 that there were 100,000 registered union members in the *Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (CGTG) and the *Confederación Nacional Campesino de Guatemala* (CNCG). This figure compares with a total vote of about 415,000 in the presidential election in 1950 and underscores an important factor in Guatemalan politics: that a political party can readily succeed in the present atmosphere if it is supported by organized labor.

Organized labor itself claims an even greater number of adherents. The CGTG in August 1953 claimed a membership of 104,000 and the CNCG in 1952 claimed 215,000 members, a total for both of 319,000 or a number equivalent to three-quarters of the 1950 vote. The discrepancy between the Administrative Department of Labor's figure of 100,000 and the two federations' claim of 319,000 is doubtless mainly accounted for by the latter's gross exaggeration, but a subsidiary factor is that there is a time lag between the organization of unions and federations and their registration. There are thus most probably more than 100,000 unionized urban and rural workers in Guatemala, though only a small proportion of that number could be considered as active in union affairs.

The labor movement has been primarily concerned with politics rather than pure labor matters since its inception in a modern form in 1944. To a large extent this was inevitable, both because no labor organization of any complexion had much chance of establishing itself without collaborating closely with the administration and because Communists and Communist sympathizers proved to be the only labor organizers prepared to set a new labor movement on its feet. By 1953 the CGTG and CNCG had become a key factor in politics: their representatives were in the majority on the local and departmental Agrarian Committees under the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law; Guillermo Ovando Arriola, the CNCG Secretary for Agrarian Affairs, was president of Congress; and 3 CGTG and 3 CNCG officers¹ and several members of each organization were deputies in Congress.

¹ Gutiérrez, Pellecer, and César Montenegro Paniagua of the CGTG and Ovando Arriola, Alfonso Portillo, and José Ernesto Lanfur Fuentes of the CNCG. The first 3 are PGT deputies, the last 3 PAR deputies.

2. *Communist Control of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala*: The CGTG, founded in October 1951, is Guatemala's national labor federation, and its leadership is to all intents and purposes completely under the control of the PGT Political Committee. With the exception of a very few independent local unions, it represents all organized industrial, transportation, and commercial labor and has a considerable number of agricultural workers' federations, including the union of the workers at the United Fruit Company plantations. The CGTG affiliation with the WFTU and Vicente Lombardo Toledano's CTAL were accepted in 1953.

The key positions in the CGTG are all held by PGT members. Gutiérrez, a member of the PGT Political Committee and the head of the PGT Central Committee's Labor Union Commission, is its Secretary General. José Alberto Cardoza, also of the PGT Political Committee is First Vice Secretary General. Pellicer, another PGT Political Committee member, is the most active of the Secretaries for Labor Disputes. Virgilio Guerra, of the Political Committee, is CGTG Secretary for Organization. Carlos Manuel Pellicer of the Political Committee is the leading Secretary for Labor Disputes. Maximiliano Salazar Garcia, listed as a member in the PGT's December 1952 petition for registration, is Secretary for Rural Workers Relations. Antonio Ovando Sánchez, the Communist who went to Moscow in the early 1930's, was a leading spirit of the *Escuela Claridad*, Communist labor school after the 1944 revolution, and now another PGT member listed on the party's registration petition is Secretary for Laws and Resolution. Miguel Marmol, the Salvadoran Communist of the *Escuela Claridad* group, is from time to time reported in the press at CGTG headquarters, where he may be continuing the advisory function which he undertook for the CTG in 1944.

3. *Communist Influence on the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala*: The PGT exerts a strong ideological influence rather than organizational control over the CNCG, only one of whose present officers is publicly known to be a member of the PGT.² The CNCG, founded in June 1951, is the national federation of *campesina* organizations, that is, organizations of hired farm workers, of small tenant farmers, and of small farmers, most of whom in Guatemala are Indians. Among farm laborers its activities overlap with those of the CGTG which is currently expanding its agricultural affiliates in connection with the Agrarian Reform Law. This has resulted in some organizational conflict and jealousies, none of which, however, have extended into the sphere of ideology. The CNCG's orientation has remained in harmony with the PGT Political Committee's program and, in October 1953, the CNCG became affiliated with the

² Berto Delio Castro, member of the CNCG Consultative Council.

WFTU and the CTAL, the labor Communist international organizations.

A good deal of the CNCG's Communist ideological orientation stems from the Secretary General, Leonardo Castillo Flores, a 36-year-old *ladino* schoolteacher. Although not a PGT member as far as is known, he is a vice president of the National Peace Committee; was appointed a delegate to the abortive Continental Peace Congress in Montevideo in 1952 and a delegate to the WFTU's Third World Congress of Trade Unions in Vienna in October 1953; and went to the Soviet Union the following month. In July 1952 when Fortuny attacked leaders of the PRG as "deviationists," he specifically excepted Castillo Flores, and the latter soon thereafter withdrew his support from the PRG and Charnaud MacDonald, with whom the CNCG had formerly been closely politically allied. He pledged to devote himself entirely to support the "alliance of the workers and peasants," and was followed by Clodoveo Torres Moss and Oscar Bautista of the CNCG Executive Committee, and with their support succeeded in October 1952 in expelling Amor Velasco de León, the Secretary of Organization and number-two man of the CNCG, a left-winger who nonetheless resisted the organization's moves toward the PGT orbit. Despite a Communist tint to his political thinking, however, Castillo Flores at times has been in conflict with the PGT leadership.

At present, the CNCG is closely affiliated with the left wing of the PAR and the leaderships of the two organizations are interlocked. Castillo Flores is a member of the PAR Political Committee. Ovando Arriola, the ex-president of Congress (1953-54), is concurrently the CNCG's Secretary for Agrarian Affairs and the PAR's Secretary for Organization. Marco Antonio Soto is the CNCG's Secretary for Agricultural Affairs and Credit and the PAR's Secretary for Peasant Affairs.

E. THE OTHER "MASS ORGANIZATIONS"

1. *The Role of the "Mass Organizations"*: Around the solid core of the PGT and its position in the Government, the political parties and the labor unions, the PGT Political Committee has organized a periphery of other "mass organizations" consisting of intellectuals, youth, students', and women's groups. The principal ones are the *Comité Nacional de la Paz* (The National Peace Committee), the *Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala* (AJDG), the *Frente Universitario Democrática* (FUD), the *Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca* (AFG), the *Confederación de Estudiantes de Post Primaria* (CEP), and the *Saker-Ti* group of young intellectuals and writers.

³ Born on November 25, 1917.

These organizations serve multiple purposes for the PGT which dominates each one of them. For immediate use, they constitute a propaganda apparatus for disseminating the party line, sometimes tailored to the background of the membership, over a wider area than is covered by the other organizations under PGT guidance. At the same time, they are useful in adding their voices to those of labor organizations and political parties to provide the semblance of "popular support" for a PGT project, such as a protest against American "intervention" in Guatemalan affairs or a "Peace" petition. For use in the longer pull, these organizations provide an educational apparatus for training future party members and leaders. They provide the stage on which fledgling leftist extremists can be indoctrinated, tested, and observed. Finally, by providing trips to numerous "Congresses" in Europe and elsewhere they provide ready contacts between the local Communist movement and the main currents of international communism. The details of the financing of these trips is one of the obscurities of Guatemalan Communist activities, but the evidence indicates in outline that collections from the membership are augmented by funds or tickets supplied by the parent organizations in Europe.

These Guatemalan "mass" organizations all have certain common characteristics. They claim to be "nonpartisan" organizations representing people without discrimination as to class, religion, or political belief. On these grounds, they take in a good many non-Communist opportunists in the administration's "revolutionary" movement who find the "mass organizations" an acceptable manner of recording leftist zeal. They also attract a fringe of the duped, the eccentric, and the old-fashioned pacifists, and they have proved on a number of occasions not to be above using non-Communist names without permission.

They have another characteristic in common in that they virtually always contain a PGT member, under the discipline of the Political Committee, in a key position, usually as Secretary General or Secretary for Organization.

Most of the "mass organizations," moreover, share the characteristic of affiliation to a recognized international Communist organization, paralleling the CGTG's affiliation to the WFTU.

2. *The Comité Nacional de la Paz*: Guatemala's National Peace Committee, an affiliate of the World Congress of Peace, was established in its present form in Guatemala in 1949¹ at a meeting presided over by Fortuny after he, Gutiérrez and Solórzano attended the First World Congress of the Partisans of Peace. At that meeting Jaime

Díaz Rozzotto, the present Secretary General of the President's Executive Office, was elected as the first Secretary General.

The present leadership of the National Peace Committee, elected on June 14, 1952, illustrates the PGT's technique of control. The president is Antonio Cruz Franco, a leftist lawyer who was briefly on the Supreme Court in 1945, but the Secretary General is Mario Silva Jonama, the PGT Secretary for Education, who was in the Soviet Union in 1952. The vice presidents are Luis Cardoza y Aragón, a leading Communist-line Guatemalan poet and critic who served as Minister to Moscow in 1945; Gutiérrez, the PGT member who is Secretary General of the CGTG; Maj. Marco Antonio Franco Chacón, a leftist army officer, PAR deputy, and current president of Congress who went to Budapest in 1953; Sra. Elena de Barrios Klée, principal of the "Belén" Government Girls' School where Communist-line meetings are held and wife of Waldemar Barrios Klée, PGT member and Chief of the Lands Section of the National Agrarian Department.

The other officers of the National Peace Committee are Secretary for Organization, Marco Antonio Blanco, the PGT member who is an inspector of the National Agrarian Department; Secretary for Propaganda, Oscar Edmundo Palma, a member of the PGT Central Committee, officer of the teachers' union STEG, and contributor in September 1953 of a firsthand account of Soviet "progress" to the PGT's *Tribuna Popular*; Secretary for Press, Raúl Leiva, head of the Press Section of the President's Information Office; Secretary for Finance, Sra. Atala Valenzuela, a member listed by the PGT in its 1952 petition for registration; Secretary for Liaison (Relations), Carlos Alvarado Jérez, the Chief of the Directorate General of Radio Broadcasting of the Ministry of Communications who is an avowed Communist; and Secretary for Minutes, Julio Ernesto Juárez.

The National Peace Committee has subsidiary committees in the departments and municipalities of the Republic (the president of the unit in the Department of Guatemala is Guillermo Ovando Arriola, the ex-president of Congress) and conducts a rather intensive activity which is reinforced by the CGTG, the CNGC, the administration political parties, and the other "mass" organizations. It circulates petitions for peace, holds local and national peace congresses, releases statements on world events which receive prominent play in the leftist and Government press, and publishes a leaflet-like periodical *Por la Paz* edited by Otto Raúl González.

In 1952 the Committee sponsored showings of the film, *Bacteriological Warfare in Korea*, purporting to prove that the United States employed germ warfare during the Korean hostilities. Several of the showings were in Government schools.

On September 19, 1953, the National Peace Committee initiated a "Campaign for Negotiations" in response to the Budapest World

¹ An earlier "Committee for Peace and Democracy" was founded in September 1948 in the presence of Roberto Moreno, reportedly sent by Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

Peace Council's appeal for big power negotiations on outstanding international questions. It has set itself a quota of 125,000 signatures on a petition for such negotiations, a statistic which illuminates its present capacities.

The National Peace Committee has also sponsored delegations to the various congresses of the Soviet-dominated peace movement notably the voyages of Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, at the time president of Congress, to the 1951 Vienna Peace Conference; of Mario Silva Jonama and José Alberto Cardoza to the preparatory and full-dress Peking Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conferences in June and September 1952; and of Lt. Col. Carlos Paz Tejada, ex-Chief of the Armed Forces (1949); Maj. Mario Antonio Franco Chacón, the PAR deputy, and Oscar Edmundo Palma of the PGT, to the Budapest meeting of the World Council for Peace in June 1953. Lieutenant Colonel Paz Tejada and Major Franco were elected at the World Peace Council at the last of these meetings.

3. *The Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala*: The AJDG, founded on December 21, 1947, is the Guatemalan affiliate of the international Communist *World Federation of Democratic Youth* (WFDY) and may be considered the training ground for youth, some of whom may later be graduated to membership in the PGT.

The leading figure in the AJDG for some years has been Huberto Alvarado, a 26-year-old member of the PGT's Central Committee and chief of that committee's Youth Commission. He has been several times Secretary General of AJDG (once in 1951) and still appears to guide its policies. In 1952-54 the Secretary General is Edelberto Torres Rivas, who attended the Bucharest Youth Festival and went to the U. S. S. R. in 1953. During his absence the Secretary Generalship passed to Bernardo Lemus, a registered Communist.

Another leading member of the AJDG is Hugo Barrios Klée, Deputy Inspector General of Labor, a PGT member, a delegate to the 1951 Berlin Youth Festival, and brother of Waldemar Barrios Klée, Chief of the Lands Section of the National Agrarian Department.

Statistics on the membership of AJDG have not recently been publicized but its activities have been extensive. Newspapers report departmental and local youth congresses and in February 1953 the AJDG was a principal sponsor of the "National Conference on the Rights of Youth." It is now instrumental in organizing a proposed "Festival of Friendship of the Youth of Central America and Caribbean," scheduled for December 1954. It also publishes a monthly review headed *Alianza*.

The AJDG sent delegations to the Berlin Youth Festival in 1950 (headed by Huberto Alvarado), to the Bucharest Youth Festival in July 1953, and the Warsaw Students' Conference in August 1953.

The delegations to the 1953 gatherings in the Soviet orbit went on, in many cases, to Moscow and toured the U. S. S. R.

4. *The Frente Universitario Democrática*: The FUD was founded on January 22, 1952, by a fusion of the *Acción Democrática Universitaria* (ADU) and the *Vanguardia Universitaria* (VU). It is an affiliate or candidate for affiliation of the Communist International Students' Union (ISU) in Prague and represents the PGT's effort to keep alive in the University at San Carlos, Guatemala's national university, the Marxist current which was so influential in the crystallization of an organized political party. It is, however, in a minority position in the student body, overshadowed by the moderate *Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios* (AEU) and rivaled by the more important *Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas* (CEUA), the leading student anti-Communist organization.

The present Secretary General of the FUD is Ricardo Ramirez, who attended the Defense of the Rights of Youth Congress in Vienna in 1953. He succeeded César Augusto Cazali Avila, member of the National Agrarian Council, Secretary for Organization of the union of the National Agrarian Department's employees, and almost certainly a member of the PGT. He attended the ISU meeting in Bucharest in the summer of 1952 and later toured several of the "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe. He has written of his experiences there for the PGT *Tribuna Popular* and his signed statements on behalf of the FUD never deviate from the PGT line.

The FUD Secretary for Organization is Julio René Estevez, who in the fall of 1953 visited the U. S. S. R. and Communist China after attending the Third World Congress of Students in Warsaw in August.

Apart from the meeting in Bucharest which Cazali attended, the FUD has sent delegations to the 1953 World Youth Festival in Bucharest and the subsequent Students' Conference in Warsaw. Several of the delegates went on to the U. S. S. R. and some to Communist China. In Guatemala it publishes a monthly review, *Nuestra Lucha*, which adheres to the Communist line.

5. *The Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca*: The AFG founded in 1947 is the Guatemalan affiliate of the Communist International Federation of Democratic Women (IFDW) and is closely connected with the PGT. One of the founding members is Sra. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, wife of the President.

The current Secretary General is Sra. Dora Franco y Franco, who has been active in Communist-line causes to the extent of traveling to European Communist-front congresses,² and who is almost certainly a member of the PGT. Another leading figure in the AFG

² During several months in mid-1953, Sra. de Urrutia, Vice Secretary General, acted as Secretary General for unexplained reasons.

is Sra. Irma Chávez de Alvarado, the Secretary for Organization, who is also the head of the Women's Commission of the PGT. She is the wife of Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, the PGT Secretary for Organization. Sra. María Jérez de Fortuny, wife of the PGT Secretary General, herself Secretary General of the National Agrarian Department, is one of the AFG's counsellors. The Secretary for Propaganda of the AFG is Sra. Elsa Casteñeda de Guerra Borges, the wife of Alfredo Guerra Borges, Secretary of the PGT temporarily in charge of propaganda.

The AFG was particularly active in promoting the Communist campaign in 1952 to "save" the Rosenbergs, the convicted atomic spies eventually executed in the United States. The organization's monthly magazine, *Mujeres*, follows the Communist line.

The AFG held its first National Congress November 26-28, 1953, and it was addressed by Sra. de Arbenz.

6. *The Confederación de Estudiantes de Post Primaria*: The CEP is a high school students' organization which follows the PGT line closely and is favorably treated in the PGT publications, giving rise to a supposition that it is under the party's influence. However, none of its officers, who are young students, can be identified as PGT members.

7. *Grupo Saker-Ti de Artistas y Escritores Jóvenes*: The *Saker-Ti* (the Dawn) organized in December 1947 is a Communist-controlled group of young intellectuals in which leading spirits are Huberto Alvarado of the AJDGC and chief of the PGT Cultural Committee's Youth Committee, and Hugo Barrios Klée. Like other "mass organizations," the *Saker-Ti* seeks to exploit non-Communist liberal sentiment, for example, praising the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but in this case their tactics were exposed in an exposé by Manuel Mario Herrera López, the organization's ex-Secretary of Organization, who resigned on January 2, 1953, and during the following July described the *Saker-Ti* as a Communist front in a series of articles for *La Hora*.

Section IV

THE PROSPECTS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

A. THE FUTURE OF THE PARTY IN GUATEMALA

1. *A Basis for Evaluation*: While it is risky to peer into the future for a glimpse at the probable lines of development of the Communist Party in Guatemala, it is possible to strike a balance sheet of the weaknesses and strengths of the PGT's position in the spring of 1954, and, postulating an unchanged international situation and the ab-

sence of coup d'état, arrive at a rough estimate of its capabilities. This estimate, spelled out in the succeeding paragraphs, indicates a probability of further increase of Communist power in Guatemala.

2. *Weaknesses of the PGT Position*: Despite the growth of the PGT as an organized party since President Arbenz came into office in 1951 and its controlling influence on Government policy, the administration parties and labor and "mass organizations," the PGT's position in the Guatemalan political organism is still subject to some theoretical weaknesses.

The first weakness of the PGT is the degree of its dependence on the good will of the Guatemalan Government, particularly of the President, and at least the neutrality of the Guatemalan Armed Forces. In spite of its considerable strides toward an independent organization with genuine strength, in over 3 full years since coming into the open in Arbenz' administration, the PGT could not operate on its present scale unless it received help from the administration. The young PGT thus is faced with the danger of severe restrictions if not extinction of its activities in the event of an unfavorable change of administration, by revolution or by other means. This danger is compounded by the fact that the PGT has yet made no palpable inroads on the Guatemalan Army.

A second weakness of the PGT is its lack of a sufficient Marxist-indoctrinated following. Despite the growing number of party members and the thousands influenced through the political, labor, and mass organizations, the PGT still appears to lack a wide enough trained personnel base from which to draw even the small number of militants necessary to carry out its program efficiently. This is indicated by the fact that the PGT uses the same individuals in a multiplicity of jobs. Gutiérrez, for example, is obliged to be simultaneously a party official, head of the labor movement, a deputy in Congress, and a leader of the Peace movement. This lack of trained personnel derives not only from the youth of the PGT but also from conditions in Guatemala which lack any significant tradition of social revolution.

The third weakness of the PGT, a corollary of the second, is that it has to face the ever-present danger that the main stream of the Guatemalan revolution of 1944 will turn into a purely opportunist channel and swamp communism. The "non-Communist" political groups supporting the Arévalo and Arbenz administrations have always had a large content of opportunism characterized by a good deal of uncomprehending lip service to Communist slogans and much real concentration on graft and political chicanery. The PGT is in a minority position where failure to manipulate these anarchical currents to its advantages might result in its being overcome by them. PGT leadership, to judge by party writings, is quite conscious of this

danger. It appears to be the main reason that the PGT has worked against the consolidation of a single official "revolutionary" party, such as the PRI in Mexico. It is also a reason that the PGT has combatted rival revolutionary doctrines which might attract some support, such as the *Aprista* doctrine in the political sphere and Peron's *ATLAS* in the labor field.

The fourth weakness of the PGT is the imperfection of its own internal organization. Its leaders are young and, compared to the Communist Parties in the industrial countries, inexperienced. There is the danger of internal dissension and, although it has not yet resulted in a major purge, there are several hints that there is some basis for possible future contention. Fortuny has stated publicly that there was a purge at the clandestine First Party Congress in 1949 but he did not reveal the grounds for it. From 1950 until early 1952 Fortuny and Gutiérrez evidently pursued the same objective but with different tactical emphases, the former standing for an open, labeled Communist Party and the latter for a Communist Party under another name (the PROG) pending further training and indoctrination. This difference was resolved by a compromise: Fortuny's party emerged as the recognized party but adopted some of Gutiérrez' viewpoints by changing the party name to the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT). It is an open question, however, whether this compromise will survive over the years the shifting tactics and fortunes of international communism. Fortuny and his associates now make up the Secretariat of the PGT while Gutiérrez and his are on a lower echelon. Meanwhile, Solórzano and others of the original Communist movement appear to be out of the PGT altogether and apparently continue to adhere to the older doctrine of promoting Communist doctrines from within the administration groups. At present there is no shred of evidence that any of these groups are pursuing a Trotskyist or other "deviationist" policy, and there are evident advantages to the Soviet international Communist movement to have alternatives in choosing factions in Guatemala. However, it is a matter for speculation whether the party could remain organizationally unshaken under the impact of a major change in the Guatemalan domestic situation or a change in Soviet policy.

The fifth weakness of the PGT is the degree to which Guatemala's political climate has changed since 1944 and especially since 1951 when the Arbenz administration came into power. The emergence of a professed Communist Party has caused a polarization of political opinion with most of the formerly economically powerful interests arrayed against the party and the Government which aids it. The balance of opinion in the San Carlos University has swerved from its 1944 high of woolly leftism to a point where it is a stronghold of anti-Communist and anti-Government sentiment despite its vo-

ciferous pro-Communist minority. The professional and business classes, which welcomed the end of the period of dictatorship in 1944 and acquiesced in its early phases of the revolution's social reforms, have balked at what they regard as the extremist currents that have taken over the revolution. The Roman Catholic Church in Guatemala has always opposed communism and its anti-Communist message has gained wider acceptance as Communist advances have impressed themselves on the public mind. The Archbishop of Guatemala, Msgr. Mariano Rossell Arellano, in his 1954 Easter Pastoral Letter called for a "National Crusade Against Communism." The independent press, which has the majority of Guatemalan newspaper circulation, is solidly against the PGT and has made communism the central domestic political issue in Guatemala. The PGT thus now faces a considerable array of hostile forces, a development it recognizes under the terminology of the "sharpening of the class struggle."

The final weakness of the PGT is that it is a distant satellite of the Soviet Communist center and derives its energy and cohesion from it. In the last analysis, if international developments were to lead to an internal explosion in the U. S. S. R. or a material weakening of the strength it transmits abroad, the PGT would be in danger of losing its cohesion, though the fragments of frustration, anticapitalism, and perverted nationalism which form it might later reform as the satellite of another virulent "ism."

3. Strength of the PGT's Position: While the weaknesses of the PGT are largely theoretical and dangerous to the party only if certain hypothetical events occur, its strengths are concrete and of immediate value, with the result that in the balance the indications for the next few years are that the PGT will advance in its program if there is no external or accidental interference in its progress.

The first asset of the PGT is that it has the initiative in Guatemalan political life and has already developed a momentum which would be difficult to stop. The Arbenz administration has committed itself to a "reform" program, the ideological content and rationalization of which has been largely the result of the PGT's manipulation of the "revolutionary movement." Thus while the administration retains the mechanical means to suppress communism (e. g. by withdrawing support or using the army) it could scarcely do so without emasculating the program to which it has dedicated itself. Arbenz himself said as much in his 1954 Message to Congress, when he said isolation of the "democratic and progressive forces" (i. e. the Communists) would be equivalent to the suicide of Guatemala's revolutionary movement.

The second asset of the PGT is the virtually total lack of organized opposition. Like the administration parties, the opposition groups

merely react to the PGT initiative and have no positive program of their own. Moreover, the propertied classes from which the opposition would naturally draw its strength are prisoners of their property: They do not, it appears, dare invite retaliation by fully supporting opposition organizations unless there is a prospect of immediate, safety-giving success. This has been mainly responsible for the phenomenon that the *Partido Unificación Anticomunista* (PUA) and the *Comité Cívico Nacional* (CCN), the main anti-Communist groups, have not risen to match the growing PGT strength but, on the contrary, have become poorer and weaker with every PGT advance. This timidity on the part of the potential opposition has been accentuated by the strong and often publicly expressed attitude of the administration equating "Anti-Communism" to subversion of the constitutional order, and by the administration's intimidation tactics such as arresting anti-Communist leaders on charges of implication in anti-Government disturbances. Moreover, the independent press which is the mainstay in keeping anticommunism alive itself is prevented from being fully effective by fear of Government reprisals as well as from a lack of full comprehension of Communist tactics.

In 1953-54 the authorities and the PGT have cooperated in a concerted drive against focal points of opposition. After an uprising at the provincial town of Salama on March 29, 1953, leading figures in the PUA, CCN, and the students' anti-Communist groups CEUA were jailed or driven into exile. More anti-Communist leaders were arrested or went into exile after the Government alleged in January 1954 that it had uncovered an "international plot" against it. In the first months of 1954, the principal anti-Communist radio stations were raided by masked hoodlums without police interference, or their owners or managers were intimidated by the authorities.

Finally a major asset of the PGT is that the working out of the existing Government programs (which it had a large share in shaping) is virtually certain to lead to an increase in Communist strength. The agrarian reform, for instance, has not only cut into the economic strength of the landowning class but brought on a decline in investment weakening the business classes. In rural areas it is educating farm workers to the attitude that they must cooperate with the Communist and Communist-influenced agrarian authorities, and at the same time it is paradoxically uprooting tradition-bound Indian laborers who do not favor the new reform but who give indications of becoming a drifting, discontented group susceptible to manipulation by extremists. Likewise, the attack on foreign companies on extreme nationalist grounds stimulated by the PGT serves a double purpose, for at once it weakens the links with the United States and weakens those concepts of property, equity, and law which serve to block the way to the eventual Communist triumph.

B. GUATEMALAN COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA

The present and possible future successes of communism in Guatemala have a wider significance than the degree to which the PGT fulfills its Guatemalan program. Foremost among the long-range benefits of the PGT's experience to international communism is that under the shelter of the Guatemalan Government, a Communist Party has been able to perfect techniques for operation in the Latin American environment, and especially for exploiting the revolutionary-nationalistic currents which are now near the surface throughout most of the area. Guatemala differs in degree but not in kind from most of her sister Latin American Republics and, under propitious circumstances, international communism may be expected to adapt the lessons learned in Guatemala to other areas. If Moscow establishes that a Communist-controlled state can be maintained without the direct or threatened protection of the Red army, it will have opened new doors to expansion and conquest.

There is already evidence that Guatemala is being used as a base for the spread of communism, especially to the rest of Central America. The country has become a focal point of communism for neighboring areas. Miguel Marmol and Virgilio Guerra, the Salvadoran Communists, are at the moment active in the Guatemalan labor movement; Abel Cuenca, a Communist or at least a thoroughgoing sympathizer, is active in political life; and 14 young Salvadorans imprisoned in their country in September 1952 for Communist activities (though stating they are not Communists) arrived in Guatemala in August 1953 under the leadership of Manuel Otilio Hasbun, ex-president of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students. In May 1954 Obdulio Barthe, the Paraguayan Communist leader, was accepted as a refugee in Guatemala. The *Asociación Democrática Salvadoreña*, an exile organization, has its meetings announced in the PGT's *Tribuna Popular*.

The Nicaraguan Communist and pro-Communist group is headed by Alejandro Bermudez Alegria, Edelberto Torres, Sr., and Armando Flores Amador (who sometimes signs as Armando Amador). This group is involved in the *Movimiento de Nicaraguenses Partidarios de la Democracia*, an anti-Somoza organization headed by Leonte Pallais Tiffer.

Leftist Honduran exiles have organized a Guatemalan affiliate of the *Partido Democrático Revolucionario Hondureño* which sends out Communist-line manifestos to the press under the signature, as of August 30, 1953, R. Amaya Amador, Secretary General.

Several Dominican exiles have been involved in a local *Comité de Exilados Dominicanos*, some members of whom, including a Felix Docoudray, are also members of the pro-Communist *Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano* which publishes, since August 19, 1953, a monthly magazine *Orientación* in Guatemala City.

The local Communists have made a particularly successful attempt to split the local group of Peruvian *Aprista* exiles. The main body, *Comité Aprista en Guatemala*, formerly under Dr. Andrés Townsend Escurra, remained faithful to an anti-Communist as well as an "anti-imperialist" line, but a splinter group named the *Movimiento Popular de la Liberación Nacional*, under Eduardo Jibaja, has cooperated with the Communists. There seems little doubt that the Guatemalan authorities favor the latter as they helped it to stage its 1953 observance of Peru's Independence Day on July 28 and Jibaja is employed by the Government newspaper *Diario de Centro América*.

The local leftists have also cultivated the local exile branch of the Venezuelan *Partido Acción Democrática* but without apparent success as yet in subverting it to Communist uses. The leader is Dr. Luis M. Peñalver, ex-vice rector of the Central University of Venezuela.

More directly it is known that officials of the PGT, including Bernardo Alvarado Monzón and Alfredo Guerra Borges, have attended meetings of Communist-front parties in the other Central American Republics and are in correspondence with the leaders of those parties, presumably serving as advisers in a manner similar to that in which more experienced Communists in earlier times aided the growth of the Communist Party in Guatemala.

The variety of Communist and leftist political exiles in Guatemala and the links between the PGT and Communist-front parties in other countries thus provide the skeleton of a system by which the Guatemalan experiment could be exported to other Latin American countries.

Already there are indications that Guatemala is being used as a base against her neighbors. The attempt to assassinate President Somoza of Nicaragua in April 1954 involved among the plotters Jorge Rivas Montes, Francisco Ibarra Mayorga, and other revolutionaries who until shortly before the plot had enjoyed the protection of the Guatemalan Government or had traveled in and out of Guatemala. The disturbances which broke out in May 1954 in Honduras, resulting in a well-organized strike, were preceded by the assignment in March and April of special Guatemalan consuls in what were to become the strike areas, and 4 days before the disturbance broke out a Guatemalan military airplane landed in the area without clearance.

The Guatemalan potential to move directly or indirectly against its anti-Communist Central American neighbors was materially enhanced on May 15, 1954, by the arrival in Puerto Barrios of the Swedish ship *Alfhem* carrying 2,000 tons of arms loaded in the port of Stettin in Polish-administered territory.

THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

A Brief Chronology

June 1944

Provisional Government headed by Gen. Federico Ponce Vaides established, after student demonstration overthrows government of General Ubico.

July–September 1944

First revolutionary parties and labor unions formed; Ponce attempts return to authoritarian government.

October 20, 1944

The Guatemalan revolution: students and young army officers, including Capt. Jacobo Arbenz, overturn Ponce government.

March 15, 1945

New Guatemalan Constitution goes into effect; forbids formation and functioning of political organizations of international or foreign character.

August 1945

Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) founded as first national labor organization; international Communists among its advisers. Shortly thereafter *Escuela Claridad*, Communist training school within the confederation, is established.

January 1946

Government closes down *Escuela Claridad*; Communists continue indoctrination through study groups.

September 28, 1947

First Communist Party founded secretly under name of *Vanguardia Democrática*; José Manuel Fortuny and other leaders continue to represent themselves to public as non-Communist political and labor leaders.

December 1947 *Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca* (AFG) Communist-front women's organization founded. Later affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Women, international Communist group.

December 21, 1947 *Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala* (AJDG) Communist-front youth organization founded. Later affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Youth, international Communist organization.

1948 José Manuel Fortuny elected Secretary General of secret Communist Party, *Vanguardia Democrática*.

April 1949 Fortuny and Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, Secretary General of CTG, attend First World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Paris; Fortuny goes on to travel behind the Iron Curtain.

July 18, 1949 Col. Francisco Xavier Arana, moderate Chief of the Armed Forces, assassinated near Lake Amatitlán; 1st Regiment revolts but is suppressed by Government, led by Minister of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Arbenz; assassins never brought to justice.

August 1949 Fortuny and Alfonso Solórzano, back from Iron Curtain trip, participate in foundation of Guatemalan National Peace Committee, Fortuny presiding over meeting.

September 28, 1949 Secret Communist Party, *Vanguardia Democrática*, holds First Party Congress; reelects Fortuny Secretary General; adopts name *Partido Comunista de Guatemala* (PCG) but remains underground.

May 25, 1950 Fortuny and ten others formally resign from *Partido Acción Revolucionaria* (PAR) in which they had remained despite 2½ years' membership in secret Communist Party.

June 21, 1950

June 1950

Summer 1950

March 15, 1951

March 23, 1951

April 4, 1951

May 1951

June 21, 1951

July 8, 1951

October 12-14, 1951

October 25, 1951-

January 9, 1952

January 12, 1952

Fortuny founds newspaper *Octubre* whose subheading is "For a Great Communist Party; Vanguard of the Workers, and the Peasants and the People"; paper carries hammer and sickle emblem.

Gutiérrez founds *Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala* (PROG), an openly Communist-line party.

Fortuny becomes campaign manager for Lieutenant Colonel Arbenz in presidential elections.

Arbenz inaugurated President.

Alfonso Solórzano, leading Communist personality, appointed manager of Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (*Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social*) (IGSS).

Fortuny signs public manifesto for first time as "Secretary General of *Partido Comunista de Guatemala*."

Louis Saillant, Secretary General of international Communist organization WFTU, and Vicente Lombardo Toledano go to Guatemala; advise unifying the Guatemalan labor movement.

PCG holds first public meeting in theater provided at Government orders; high Government officials attend.

Gutiérrez states in press interview he is a Communist.

Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) founded as single national labor federation; Gutiérrez elected Secretary General; Arbenz sends congratulations to the CGTG founding congress.

Gutiérrez attends WFTU Congress in Berlin; visits Moscow.

Gutiérrez, back in Guatemala, announces dissolution of his party, PROG; states he will join Fortuny's PCG; and advises followers to do likewise.

January 25, 1952

Cominform Bucharest newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* publishes articles on PCG, in effect publicly announcing recognition of Fortuny's party as authorized agent of international communism in Guatemala.

May 10–June 17, 1952

Agrarian Reform Law proposed by President Arbenz is steered through Congress by Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, whose president is Gutiérrez.

Summer 1952

PCG leaders participate unofficially in meetings of the administration political coalition.

December 11, 1952

PCG holds Second Party Congress, reelects Fortuny as Secretary General; changes name to *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT).

December 19, 1952
1952–1953

PGT registered as legal political party. Six members of Political Committee of Communist Party (PCG later PGT) visit U. S. S. R.: José Manuel Fortuny, Mario Silva Jonama, José Luis Ramos, José Alberto Cardoza, Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, and Virgilio Guerra.

January 16–18, 1953

Communist PGT runs in congressional elections as part of "Democratic Electoral Front," the coalition of all parties supporting President Arbenz.

February 19, 1953

Communist PGT opens "Jacobo Sánchez" training school for cadres.

March 1, 1953

President Arbenz in annual message to Congress, obviously alluding to requests Communist Party be prohibited from functioning under article 32 of Constitution, states Government will assure freedom for "all, absolutely all" political beliefs; Communists cheer this passage as assurance of support of Communist Party.

March 12, 1953

Guatemalan Congress observes minute of silence in tribute to Stalin, at time of his death.

1953

"National Democratic Front" succeeds "Democratic Electoral Front" and CGTG and CNCG are later added to political parties comprising Front; leaders, including 4 Communists and 4 or more fellow-travelers, meet regularly with President Arbenz.

April 4, 1953

Guatemala withdraws from Organization of Central American States when it became clear that the agenda of the first meeting would include an item on "resisting the subversive action of international communism."

June 22–28, 1953

Guatemalan leftist organizations observe week of "Solidarity with People of Korea," a principal feature of which is a declaration by 19 deputies, including the president and vice president of the Congress, condemning "imperialist aggression" against North Korea and charging bacteriological warfare used in Korea.

August 8–9, 1953

Party organizational conference held; claims party membership doubled since December 1952.

August 15, 1953

Communist PGT establishes daily newspaper, *Tribuna Popular*.

November 5, 1953–
January 12, 1954

José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of Communist Party, visits Moscow.

November 10, 1953

Guatemala is only state to vote against inclusion of the item "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics" on the agenda of the Tenth Inter-American Conference.

December 19, 1953

Communist-controlled *Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (CGTG) sponsors "Day of Solidarity with the Viet-namese People."

December 1953–April 1954 Communist leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer instigates peasants in Department of Escuintla and elsewhere to seize private lands; violence ensues.

January 1954 Anti-Communist leaders, accused of plotting, arrested or flee country; followed by intimidation of anti-Communist radio stations.

January 12, 1954 Fortuny returns from Moscow.

January 18, 1954 Major Martínez, Chief of National Agrarian Department and former Secretary to President Arbenz, leaves Guatemala suddenly, purportedly for Switzerland.

January 29, 1954 Minister of Czechoslovakia presents credentials to President of Guatemala.

February 1954 "National Democratic Front" meets with President Arbenz and Foreign Minister Toriello to decide tactics at Caracas Conference; 4 of Front's 10 representatives present are avowed Communists, at least 4 others fellow-travelers.

March 1–28, 1954 Guatemala sends delegation headed by Toriello to Caracas Conference; is only Government to vote against anti-Communist resolution; abstains on Panamanian resolution on racial discrimination on grounds it used phrase "as one means of combatting international Communism"; states it considers without validity the anti-Communist resolutions adopted at the Bogotá Conference of 1948 and the Washington Foreign Ministers Meeting of 1951; absents itself from Conference tribute to United Nations war dead.

March 1, 1954

President Arbenz, in annual message to Congress, indicates clear support of Communists; identifies them as "democratic" and "progressive" forces; says that to eliminate them would be equivalent to suicide of revolutionary movement.

March 25, 1954

Guatemala withdraws from Pan American Union its instrument of ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which it had submitted to the Secretariat pending result of consultation on Guatemalan reservation.

March–April 1954

Guatemala appoints special consuls to posts in northwest Honduras.

April 10–18, 1954

M/V Alfhem loads 2,000 tons of arms and munitions at Stettin, a port administered by Communist Polish Government; arms are falsely manifested as machinery, hardware, chemical and optical glass, etc.

April 18–May 15, 1954

Alfhem on voyage to Guatemala frequently changing destination en route; first ordered Dakar; orders changed successively to Curaçao, Puerto Cortes, Honduras, and finally Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.

April 25, 1954

Political Committee of PGT attacks Rio Treaty, stating that it cannot result in any good for Guatemala.

May 5, 1954

Strikes break out in northwest Honduras in region where Guatemalan consuls assigned in March–April; Honduran Government declares three consuls *personae non gratae*; accuses Communist-dominated Guatemalan labor organizations of supporting strike.

May 15, 1954

Alfhem arrives at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala; begins unloading arms cargo under guard.

June 8, 1954

President Arbenz, with approval of Congress, summoned in night, suspends constitutional guarantees; a type of reign of terror begins; hundred reported arrested, including humble farmers, on suspicion of anti-communism; bullet-riddled or beaten bodies of persons arrested by police found on streets and highways; houses searched; censorship imposed.